SERBIA AGAINST KOSOVO, RUSSIA AGAINST UKRAINE: AN ATTEMPT AT A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Dr. Ihor Todorov
Professor, Department of International Studies and Public Communications,
Uzhhorod National University, Doctor of Historical Sciences
ihor.todorov@gmail.com

Abstract

This article presents a comprehensive comparative study of the foreign policy strategies of the Russian Federation towards Ukraine and the Republic of Serbia towards Kosovo, combining historical-political, legal, cultural-civilizational, and information-propaganda approaches. The author demonstrates that, despite significant differences in scale and nature of actions, both states employ similar rhetorical and conceptual tools aimed at delegitimizing the sovereignty of the other side and legitimizing their own territorial claims.

Historical analysis shows that both conflicts have deep post-imperial roots, are fueled by competing interpretations of key historical events and artefacts, and are based on the construction of national myths serving both mobilizing and justificatory functions. In the Serbian case, the central element is the sacralization of Kosovo as the «cradle of Serbian statehood» and a symbol of national sacrifice, whereas in the Russian discourse the dominant concept is that of the «single nation» and the appropriation of the heritage of Kyivan Rus’ as a basis for denying Ukrainian identity and statehood.

A particular emphasis is placed on the informational component of both confrontations: the deliberate use of hybrid warfare, manipulation of historical memory, dissemination of disinformation narratives, and the creation of an image of «historical injustice» in need of «correction». Comparative analysis reveals differences in the implementation of these strategies: Serbia operates mainly through diplomatic means, blocking the international recognition of Kosovo while maintaining participation in negotiations and its EU candidate status, whereas Russia resorts to overt armed aggression, territorial annexation, large-scale violations of international humanitarian law, and the creation of global confrontation with the West.

The paper also analyses the positions and instruments of influence of the United States and the European Union in these conflicts. It is shown that in the case of Kosovo, EU policy is characterized by an attempt to maintain balance between the parties, whereas with regard to Ukraine, the European Union has taken an unequivocally pro-Ukrainian stance, combining financial, humanitarian, and military assistance with large-scale sanctions against Russia. The United States, in turn, acts in the Kosovo issue as an initiator and security guarantor (including through military presence in the region), and in the case of Ukraine—as a key strategic partner providing multidimensional support in the context of full-scale war.

The author concludes that a common feature in both cases is the use of revisionist narratives built on a combination of historical-cultural arguments, ethnic legitimization, and anti-Western rhetoric. These narratives function not only as tools of domestic political mobilization but also as means of foreign policy communication aimed at creating a favourable international background for the realization of strategic goals. At the same time, the differences in state behaviour and tactics show that Serbia seeks to operate within diplomatic frameworks, while Russia aims at a fundamental revision of the international order through the use of force.

The article underscores the importance of critically analysing such revisionist strategies to understand their impact on international security and to develop effective countermeasures. Combating manipulative historical narratives must become part of a global strategy to defend international law, territorial integrity, and democratic values.

Keywords: Russia–Ukraine, Serbia–Kosovo, post-imperial legacy, international law, historical narratives, hybrid warfare, diplomacy, revisionism, territorial integrity, European Union, United States, information warfare.

Problem Statement

International relations in recent decades have been marked by complex and asymmetric crises that have significantly affected both regional and global security. In this context, two conflicts deserve particular attention, as they share many similarities in their political structure and discursive framing despite differing historical and geographical backgrounds: the Serbian–Kosovar conflict and the Russian–Ukrainian war.

The first—Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008—raises a number of fundamental questions related to international law, particularly concerning sovereignty, state recognition, territorial integrity, as well as the role and legitimacy of international organizations in peacebuilding and integrating new political entities into the international system. The conflict over Kosovo reflects a protracted post-imperial struggle for political identity and the reconfiguration of the Balkan space following the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

The second case—the Russian–Ukrainian war, which began with the annexation of Crimea and military intervention in the Donbas in 2014, escalating into a full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February 2022—has consequences far beyond Eastern Europe. This conflict has served as a catalyst for global changes in the system of international security, undermining the foundations of international law and provoking profound geopolitical turbulence.

It is worth noting that developments in Ukraine are closely monitored in Kosovo, which still feels the consequences of its armed conflict with Serbia in the late 1990s. Since the new stage of the war in Ukraine began in 2022, a significant portion of Kosovar society has viewed these events through the prism of its own traumatic historical experience.

Both conflicts—whether in the Balkans or in the post-Soviet space—are accompanied by the active use of information warfare tools. The Russian Federation and the Republic of Serbia produce and disseminate narratives aimed at justifying their foreign policy actions and casting doubt on the legitimacy of their opponents. In the Russian discourse on Ukraine, the dominant themes are those of shared historical heritage and the need to «protect» Russian-speaking populations, accompanied by delegitimization of Ukrainian sovereignty and state integrity. Similarly, Serbian narratives regarding Kosovo focus on its cultural and spiritual significance for Serbian national identity, rejecting Kosovo’s independence as illegitimate and imposed by external political actors.

Both cases illustrate how geopolitical conflicts can be constructed and legitimized through appeals to historical memory, national myths, and manipulative interpretations of international law. These narratives play a key role in shaping both domestic societal consensus and foreign policy discourse, making them an essential subject for in-depth academic analysis.

Literature Review

The issue of comparing the foreign policy strategies of the Republic of Serbia regarding Kosovo and of the Russian Federation regarding Ukraine remains underdeveloped in academic discourse. Nevertheless, several Western and Balkan scholars have already made substantial attempts to analyse this phenomenon from a comparative perspective.

Noel Malcolm, in his work Kosovo: A Short History [9], convincingly demonstrates—drawing on reliable sources—that Kosovo has historically been a territory with an Albanian majority.

Edward Joseph, Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute (U.S.), argues in his publications that the issue of state sovereignty and territorial integrity in Kosovo is essentially identical to that of Ukraine. He emphasizes that the international community must not approach these cases selectively or apply double standards, since in both instances we are dealing with violations of fundamental norms of international law [7].

Kosovar scholars demonstrate the synchronization of Serbian and Russian messaging across numerous sources. Agim Musliu and Gurakuç Kuçi further links informational and religious-ideological narratives to broader security scenarios [13]. An insightful comparison of Serbia’s and Russia’s narrative strategies is offered by Pristina-based researcher Arben Fetoshi. In his work, he examines how Russia and Serbia employ concepts of historical heritage, national identity, and territorial integrity to construct manipulative geopolitical narratives aimed at delegitimizing the state sovereignty of Ukraine and Kosovo, respectively. The author shows that both discourses center on the deliberate construction of an image of «historical injustice» that must be rectified through a revision of the existing political status quo [4].

Despite the existence of a number of specialised publications, a systematic comparative analysis of Serbia’s and Russia’s foreign policy approaches in the context of the Kosovo and Ukraine conflicts remains insufficiently developed. There is a clear need for an interdisciplinary study that examines similarities and differences in the use of historical narratives, soft power instruments, strategies for legitimizing territorial claims, as well as the impact of these strategies on shaping the international perception of both conflicts. This line of research undoubtedly holds significant scholarly value and deserves further attention from both Ukrainian and international academics.

Research Aim and Objectives

The primary aim of this article is to conduct a comparative analysis of the foreign policy strategies of the Russian Federation towards Ukraine and the Republic of Serbia towards Kosovo in both historical and contemporary contexts. The study seeks to identify common features and differences in the methods, discursive practices, and political narratives employed by both states to legitimize their aggressive actions against neighbouring countries.

To achieve this aim, the following research objectives were set:

• To carry out a historical-political analysis of the origins of the Serbian–Kosovar and Russian–Ukrainian conflicts, taking into account the geopolitical context of their formation and escalation;
• To compare the foreign policy strategies of the Republic of Serbia regarding Kosovo and the Russian Federation regarding Ukraine, with particular attention to instruments of informational influence, legal argumentation, and appeals to historical memory;
• To assess the role of external actors—primarily the United States of America and the European Union—in shaping the international response to these conflicts, as well as their influence on developments in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe.

The implementation of the research aim and objectives is based on an interdisciplinary approach and relies on a wide range of sources, including international legal documents, national legislative acts, public speeches of political leaders, and media materials.

Geopolitical Context and the Informational Component of Both Conflicts

The large-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in February 2022 became not only a turning point in bilateral relations between the two states, but also a factor that triggered profound shifts in the global security system. The war prompted a reassessment of threat scenarios in many regions, including the Western Balkans, which, although not a direct theatre of military operations, have been significantly affected within the broader space of hybrid confrontation.

These transformations have had a direct impact on the security environment of Kosovo and adjacent territories, which remain vulnerable to external manipulation and political provocation. Hybrid warfare, as a form of indirect aggression, plays a key role both in Russia’s strategy against Ukraine and in Serbia’s political arsenal regarding Kosovo. Its main instruments include the deliberate dissemination of disinformation narratives, manipulation of historical memory, falsification of facts, and the creation of an enemy image to mobilize domestic support for aggressive actions.

In Russia’s case, this involves large-scale use of state-controlled media, online platforms, and diplomatic statements to shape a distorted picture of reality aimed at justifying aggression against Ukraine as «protection» of the Russian-speaking population, «fighting Nazism», or reclaiming «historical territories».

In Serbia’s case, similar rhetoric is also widely employed, primarily within the domestic information space, via pro-government media and certain political organizations that exert informational and psychological influence on the population of Kosovo and on regional Serbian enclaves. In extreme forms of hybrid influence, provocative actions by Serbian groups connected to the political establishment in Belgrade have been recorded, creating risks of conflict escalation. Such actions often aim to destabilize the situation, delegitimize Kosovo’s statehood, and block its Euro-integration course.

Comparative Analysis of the Origins of the Serbia–Kosovo Conflict: Historical, Cultural, and Linguistic-Archaeological Dimensions

To gain a deeper understanding of the nature of the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo, it is necessary to undertake a comparative analysis of the historical origins of this confrontation. At its core lies a complex historical legacy that includes conflicting national narratives, divergent interpretations of historical sources, and competition for symbolic legitimization of territorial rights.

A key point of contention between the Serbian and Kosovar–Albanian sides is the issue of historical priority in the settlement of the territory of present-day Kosovo. The Albanian side substantiates its claim to autochthony through an interdisciplinary body of evidence—archaeological, historical, and linguistic. One of the central pieces of evidence in this system of argumentation is a monumental Latin inscription discovered on the territory of the ancient Roman city of Ulpiana, dating back to the reign of Emperor Justinian I. This artefact is interpreted as material confirmation of the early integration of the Albanian-speaking ethnos into the Romano-Byzantine cultural-political system, thereby strengthening the case for the historical continuity of the Albanian presence in the region.

Linguistic research, particularly in the field of comparative-historical grammar, combined with historical and toponymic sources, makes it possible to trace ethnogenetic continuity between the Illyrian tribes—particularly the Dardanians—and modern Albanians. In this context, special attention is drawn to the thesis that Albanians are the only Balkan people (apart from the Greeks) whose ethnic and linguistic identity retains a direct link to pre-Roman civilizational formations, specifically the Illyrian ethno-cultural area. This conclusion rests on research in archaeology, linguistics, religious studies, and cultural history. Archaeological finds and textual evidence attest to the early spread of Christianity in the territory of present-day Albania as early as the early Imperial period, indicating the region’s integration into the Christian oecumene. Furthermore, established lexical, phonological, and morphological similarities between Illyrian, Latin, and Albanian languages enable scholars to advance a well-grounded hypothesis of genetic continuity between the ancient Illyrian population and modern Albanians. This position has gained increasing support among Balkan studies experts working at the intersection of history, linguistics, and archaeogenetics.

By contrast, official Serbian historiography constructs an alternative narrative model affirming the exclusivity of Serbian historical-cultural presence in the territory of Kosovo. The central motif of this version is the sacralization of the Kosovo myth, focusing on the Battle of Kosovo Field in 1389 between Serbian forces led by Prince Lazar and the Ottoman army under Sultan Murad I. Although, according to historical sources, both commanders were killed and the battle’s outcome remained essentially inconclusive, in the Serbian national narrative this event acquired the status of a sacred symbol of sacrifice and spiritual victory over foreign domination.

It should be noted that Serbian historical tradition largely denies the autochthony of the Albanian population of Kosovo, portraying it as the result of later resettlement following the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans. In this discourse, Albanians are positioned as an incoming ethnos that took advantage of the political transformation of the region during the Ottoman period to gradually displace the Serbian element. This contradicts the findings of scholarly research, including the works of Schmitt [18], which confirm the presence of Albanian-speaking populations in these lands prior to the Slavic expansion that began around the sixth century.

Thus, the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo is not merely political-legal and geopolitical in nature, but also has a profound historical-cultural foundation, underpinning the confrontation at the level of collective memory, identity, and historical legitimization of territorial claims. Opposing interpretations of a shared past generate mutually exclusive historical narratives, which, in turn, fuel contemporary political conflicts, complicating the process of peaceful settlement and interethnic dialogue.

The historical mythology built around the concept of «Kosovo as the cradle of Serbian statehood» plays a fundamental role in shaping national identity. In the 13th–14th centuries, Kosovo indeed served as the administrative and spiritual centre of medieval Serbian statehood, in particular due to the location of the Patriarchate of Peja (Peć)—the seat of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The historical mythology built around the notion of «Kosovo as the cradle of Serbian statehood» plays a fundamental role in shaping national identity. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Kosovo was indeed an administrative and spiritual center of medieval Serbian statehood, not least due to the presence of the Patriarchate of Peja (Peć), the seat of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Serbian historiography has constructed a narrative of the loss of a «historic Serbian space» and the displacement of the indigenous population. In reality, however, Kosovo has historically been a territory with an Albanian majority. Noel Malcolm notes that the Albanian language may have spread in Kosovo even before the arrival of the Slavs. Place names such as Skopje (Shkup) and Sharr (Šar) have been preserved, indicating a longstanding Albanian presence in the region. In the chrysobull of the Serbian ruler Stefan Dušan, «Albanian cottages» around Prizren are recorded—among them, nine Albanian villages were granted to the monastery in Prizren. By the nineteenth century, western and central Kosovo already had a significant, in some areas dominant, Albanian population. According to the research of Gustav Weigand, at the beginning of the twentieth century Albanians constituted the majority in several districts of Kosovo: Pristina — 67% Albanians; Prizren — 63%; Vushtrri — 90%; Ferizaj — 70%; Gnjilane — 75%. The 1921 official census conducted by the Yugoslav authorities confirmed these patterns, showing that Albanians accounted for approximately 65.8% of Kosovo’s population by native language, while Serbo-Croatian speakers comprised 26%. Within the framework of the London Conference (1912–1913), which concluded with the Treaty of London, the decision was taken to establish the independent Principality of Albania. However, a substantial part of the Albanian-populated territories—including Kosovo—was excluded from the new state and annexed to Serbia. This decision in effect acknowledged Kosovo as technically and demographically an Albanian region, while leaving it outside the Albanian state for political reasons [9].

From its incorporation into the Kingdom of Serbia after the First Balkan War in 1912 and later into «Greater Albania» under Italian control during the Second World War, the region underwent continuous changes in status. As part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Kosovo became an autonomous province within the Socialist Republic of Serbia. The 1974 constitutional reform effectively granted the province a status close to that of a republic. Following the death of Josip Broz Tito in 1980, large-scale Albanian protests began, demanding republican status. In response, Serbian authorities resorted to repressive measures. Despite certain attempts to address the conflict socio-economically—such as through the development of education (the University of Pristina became one of the largest in Europe at that time)—the political crisis only deepened.

A new stage in the political exploitation of the historical narrative began on 28 June 1989, when the President of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, delivered a speech at Gazimestan—the symbolic site of the Battle of Kosovo. This address became a culmination point for the revival of Serbian nationalist discourse in the post-socialist context. In his rhetoric, Milošević actively employed the Kosovo myth as a tool of political mobilization, reinforced with imagery of collective suffering and historical injustice. His interpretation of the battle as a sacralized moment of national sacrifice was aimed at consolidating Serbian ethnopolitical identity, legitimizing his own authority, and justifying expansionist tendencies both domestically and abroad.

Milošević’s speech marked a turning point in interethnic relations within the multiethnic Yugoslav federation. Declaring the goal of uniting the «divided Serbian people», he abandoned empirically grounded historical analysis in favour of politicized myth-making, disregarding both historical facts and the reality of peaceful interethnic coexistence. The Kosovo myth was integrated into state ideology as a means of morally legitimizing political aggression and mass mobilization. In 1989, Milošević revoked Kosovo’s autonomy, establishing direct governance from Belgrade, which led to mass dismissals of Albanian employees in the public sector, including educators, healthcare workers, and administrative staff.

In response, a non-violent Albanian resistance emerged, gradually institutionalizing itself in the form of a parallel system of education, healthcare, and political representation. Ibrahim Rugova was elected President of Kosovo, but Belgrade refused to recognize any form of autonomous governance. This led to the radicalization of part of the Albanian population and the creation of the Kosovo Liberation Army, which began armed struggle against Serbian forces.

The armed conflict that unfolded in 1998–1999 was accompanied by massive human rights violations, including ethnic cleansing, killings, and forced displacement. More than 13,000 Kosovars were killed, and approximately one million people became internally displaced. The war ended after 15 months, following NATO’s 78-day intervention. Upon the withdrawal of Serbian forces, Kosovo came under temporary UN administration in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244 [21] .

The argument of Kosovo’s «unilateral» declaration of independence in 2008 is frequently invoked by Belgrade and Moscow. Yet, when examined through credible international sources, a different picture emerges: the process was long, multilateral, and coordinated, rather than a «sudden act». United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) established a temporary international protectorate over Kosovo (administered by UNMIK with security provided by KFOR), recognized Kosovo’s «substantial autonomy» within Yugoslavia, and envisioned a political process to determine its final status. After several years of negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina, UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari presented the «Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement». The plan provided for Kosovo’s «supervised independence»: constitutional guarantees for the Serbian minority, continued international presence (EULEX, ICO), and the controlled establishment of state institutions. Although Belgrade rejected the plan, it was endorsed by the United States, the European Union, and the majority of NATO member states [8].

On 17 February 2008, the Kosovo parliament declared independence, explicitly referencing the Ahtisaari Plan. The declaration was coordinated with key international partners. The following day it was recognized by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Turkey, and within weeks by the majority of EU and NATO states.

Serbia subsequently appealed to the International Court of Justice. In its Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, the Court confirmed that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not violate international law and therefore did not constitute an «illegal unilateral act» [1]. Thus, Kosovo’s independence was not a «unilateral act» but the outcome of a coordinated process under international supervision, culminating in the parliament’s formal declaration. While Serbia continues to contest Kosovo’s statehood, the matter is not unresolved. From both a legal and political perspective, Kosovo’s statehood has been settled—legitimized by the ICJ’s 2010 Advisory Opinion. The declaration of independence did not contravene international law. The positions of key global actors are also divided: the United States and the European Union support Kosovo’s statehood, while the Russian Federation sides with Serbia. Thus, the Balkans once again become an arena of geopolitical confrontation, where the intersection of historical myths and political interests continues to shape the trajectory of regional development.

In Serbian nationalist historiography, the discourse of victimization functions both as a symbol of moral righteousness and as an instrument of contemporary political power. Milošević’s Gazimestan speech became a reference point for consolidating the narrative of sacrificial nationalism, serving as legitimization for both internal repression and geopolitical confrontation. Demographic arguments regarding the status of Albanians form a counter-narrative of their «inauthenticity», which fuels the intractability of the conflict.

Historical Roots of the Russian–Ukrainian Confrontation

The historical roots of the current Russian–Ukrainian conflict extend deep into the past and are linked to disputes over shared historical heritage, cultural identity, and the right to political subjectivity. One of the central points of tension is the interpretation of the legacy of Kyivan Rus’—a medieval polity considered the cradle of the East Slavic peoples. Beginning in the 18th century, Russian imperial historiography systematically promoted the narrative that Rus’ was the “predecessor” of the Muscovite state, thereby seeking to diminish the historical connection of Kyiv and the Ukrainian people to this heritage [14].

This ideological paradigm was complemented by the concept of the «triune people»—Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians—presented as parts of a single «Russian people». This myth, lacking any linguistic or anthropological basis, became a tool of Russification and cultural assimilation.

In the 18th–19th centuries, most Ukrainian lands came under the control of the Russian Empire. From that time onward, a systematic policy of Russification began: the prohibition of the Ukrainian language (the Valuev Circular of 1863, the Ems Ukaz of 1876), and the persecution of nationally oriented intellectuals. These measures bore all the hallmarks of colonial policy—economic exploitation, cultural marginalization, and administrative unification.

In the 20th century, after a brief period of independence in 1917–1921, Ukraine was incorporated into the USSR as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. While the Ukrainian SSR formally retained the attributes of statehood, its political autonomy was illusory. One of the most tragic episodes was the Holodomor of 1932–1933—a man-made famine caused by the policies of the Stalinist regime, which, according to the findings of numerous historians and the official recognition of several states, constituted genocide [19].

During and after the Second World War, the Ukrainian SSR incorporated western Ukrainian territories annexed by the USSR from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. Armed resistance to Soviet rule by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) continued until the mid-1950s. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine declared independence. Although it initially sought to maintain good-neighbourly relations with Russia, fundamental disagreements—particularly over the Black Sea Fleet, the status of Crimea, and energy policy—quickly became sources of tension. Under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine renounced nuclear weapons in exchange for «security assurances» from Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom [11].

In the 2000s, Russia intensified its promotion of the concept of the «Russian World» (Russkiy mir)—a quasi-cultural space envisaging the restoration of Russian influence over the post-Soviet area. In Ukraine, this provoked conflict between European and pro-Russian development vectors. The Orange Revolution of 2004 marked a turning point, demonstrating Ukrainian society’s readiness to defend its civilizational choice. However, after the election of Viktor Yanukovych as President of Ukraine in 2010, there was a partial return of Ukraine into Moscow’s orbit. The refusal to sign the EU Association Agreement in 2013—prompted by Russian pressure—triggered mass protests that escalated into the Revolution of Dignity (2013–2014) [10].

Following Yanukovych’s flight to Russia, Moscow launched direct military aggression—first through the occupation of Crimea, and subsequently by creating and supporting separatist movements in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 violated numerous norms of international law, including the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act.

The Minsk Agreements of 2014 and 2015, aimed at resolving the conflict in Donbas, remained unimplemented due to divergent interpretations of obligations by the parties. Russia used these agreements as a means to promote political autonomy for the territories under its control, undermining Ukrainian sovereignty [20]. Between 2014 and 2021, Russia conducted active informational, cyber, and political expansion in Ukraine, including the support of pro-Russian political forces and the militarization of occupied Crimea [5].

On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, declaring objectives of «denazification» and «demilitarization». However, analyses of political speeches, actions, and strategies of the Russian Federation reveal that the true aim is the destruction of Ukrainian statehood, the return of Ukraine into Moscow’s sphere of influence, and the revision of the geopolitical order established after the Cold War.

Thus, Russia’s war against Ukraine is not merely a struggle for territory, but an existential war over Ukraine’s right to a distinct identity, statehood, and European choice. As long as Russia refuses to recognize Ukraine’s subjectivity as an independent nation, the conflict will remain open and acute.

Comparative Analysis of Serbia’s Policy towards Kosovo and the Russian Federation’s Aggression against Ukraine

The policies of the Republic of Serbia towards Kosovo and of the Russian Federation towards Ukraine share a number of structural similarities, particularly in the use of historical narratives, appeals to international law, and the construction of a «victim» image. At the same time, there are fundamental differences in the methods, intensity, and scale of their actions.

Serbia consistently refuses to recognize Kosovo’s independence, regarding it as an integral part of its territory in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), which formally affirms the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now Serbia) [21].

Russia, by contrast, denies the legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood altogether, promoting the thesis that Ukraine is an “artificial construct,” part of the «Russian World», and that Ukrainians constitute «one people» with Russians [16]. Such narratives are voiced by the highest officials of the Russian Federation, including President Vladimir Putin.

Serbia primarily employs diplomatic and legal mechanisms: it blocks Kosovo’s membership in international organizations (UN, UNESCO, Interpol), engages in EU-mediated negotiations (the Brussels Dialogue), and has partially agreed to technical compromises (the Ohrid Agreement, 2023).

Russia, on the other hand, has engaged in direct armed aggression: in 2014 it annexed Crimea, initiated hybrid warfare in Donbas, and from 24 February 2022 has pursued a full-scale invasion of Ukraine [2]. It has carried out mass shelling of civilian infrastructure, population deportations, and forced «passportization».

Serbia’s policy—although controversial—is not perceived by the international community as overtly aggressive or in violation of international law. Serbia remains a candidate for EU membership and participates in peace processes, despite its firm stance on Kosovo [7].

Russia’s policy, conversely, has been unanimously condemned by most of the world’s states. The UN General Assembly, in March 2014 and again in October 2022, adopted resolutions reaffirming Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Serbia invokes the historical role of Kosovo as the «cradle of Serbian civilization» (the 1389 Battle of Kosovo)—a motif heavily used in political mobilization.

Russia promotes narratives about a «shared historical destiny» with Ukraine, portraying Kyiv as the «spiritual capital» of Rus’ and equating Kyivan Rus’ with the historical origins of Moscow [10].

Serbia actively references the «violation of the rights of the Serbian minority in Kosovo» as a justification for its position. This theme is present in appeals to the UN and in negotiations with the EU [3]. Russia instrumentalizes the issue of protecting «Russian-speaking populations» as a casus belli. This policy includes the notion of «protecting compatriots»—a term formalized in Russia’s foreign policy concept as early as the 1990s [17].

Both states employ the narrative of being «victims» of geopolitical injustice—Serbia in the context of losing Kosovo, Russia in the context of the «loss» of Ukraine and «provocations» by NATO. However, in Russia’s case, this strategy is far more aggressive, serving as justification for an active war, whereas in Serbia’s case it functions more as a means of political bargaining with the EU.

Since 2014, Vladimir Putin has consistently invoked the Kosovo precedent to legitimize the annexation of Crimea, claiming that the West had already violated the principle of territorial integrity [2]. However, as noted by the International Court of Justice, Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not violate international law, as it breached no peremptory norm (jus cogens) [6].

Moreover, Kosovo’s independence followed a prolonged period of ethnic cleansing, war crimes by Serbia, and the failure of peaceful settlement efforts—none of which were present in Crimea in 2014.

Differences in state behaviour:

• Serbia: since 1999 has not used its army against Kosovo; participates in EU-mediated negotiations; maintains diplomatic channels; retains EU candidate status.
• Russia: conducts large-scale war; ignores negotiations except for issuing ultimatums; commits war crimes (recognized by the UN and ICC) [8]; seeks a full revision not only of the post-Soviet space but of the broader international order.

While both states—Serbia and Russia—deny the sovereignty of the other side (Kosovo and Ukraine, respectively) and use historical-cultural arguments as tools for legitimizing their actions, their approaches differ substantially. Serbia pursues an asymmetric but diplomatic policy, seeking to balance principle with European integration, whereas Russia wages an overt war of conquest aimed at the deliberate destruction of Ukrainian statehood. In a moral-political sense, Serbia may be seen as a «victim of loss», while Russia is the «initiator of destruction».

Comparison of the Positions of the United States and the European Union Regarding Serbia/Kosovo and Russia/Ukraine

United States Policy

Serbia–Kosovo Conflict (primarily 1990s–2020s)
The objectives of U.S. policy were: to protect Kosovar Albanians, end the humanitarian catastrophe, and ensure stability in the Balkans. The legal justification was a humanitarian intervention (albeit without a UN mandate). The forms of involvement included the NATO military operation (1999) and diplomatic support for Kosovo’s independence. The U.S. has maintained a military presence in the form of the permanent Camp Bondsteel base. The core narrative of U.S. policy was: “Peace, stability, protection of civilians, and an end to ethnic cleansing.”

Russian–Ukrainian War (since 2014, and especially after the full-scale invasion in 2022)

The objectives of U.S. policy were: to defend Ukraine’s sovereignty, deter Russia, and uphold international law. U.S. involvement has taken the form of extensive military, economic, humanitarian, and intelligence support for Ukraine (without direct military engagement). The narrative from 2014 to 2024 was: “Defending democracy, sovereignty, and the global order; countering autocracy.” However, the situation has changed significantly during President Donald Trump’s second term.

European Union Policy

Serbia/Kosovo
The EU’s approach is focused on normalizing relations and stabilizing the Western Balkans. Its position towards the parties is de facto neutral: not all EU member states recognize Kosovo (22 out of 27 have done so). The EU remains the main mediator in the Kosovo–Serbia dialogue (the so-called Brussels Process). Its main instruments of influence are the prospect of EU membership for both Kosovo and Serbia, financial assistance through the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, and security engagement via the EULEX Mission. The rhetoric and political narrative of the EU is: “Careful balance, pursuit of sustainable normalization.” However, the EU’s unity is limited by the non-recognition of Kosovo by Spain, Cyprus, Slovakia, Romania, and Greece.

Russia/Ukraine
The EU unanimously supports Ukraine as a sovereign state, including its temporarily occupied territories. Its instruments include large-scale financial, humanitarian, and military assistance, as well as 18 packages of sanctions against the Russian Federation. EU security involvement is limited to supporting the modernization of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and cyber defence, though discussions on deploying EU peacekeepers continue. Ukraine was granted EU candidate status in 2022, with an open prospect for future accession negotiations. The EU’s rhetoric and political narrative is: “Uncompromising support for Ukraine, strong condemnation of Russia as the aggressor.” The level of unity is high (all member states have condemned Russian aggression and supported sanctions), though certain specifics exist in the positions of Hungary and Slovakia.

Common Elements of EU Policy

The EU’s diplomatic approach avoids the use of force, opting for dialogue and conditional pressure. Integration incentives, such as the prospect of membership, are presented as strategic goals for both regions. Financial assistance serves as a long-term instrument for supporting reforms. The EU supports democratization and reforms by providing technical and legal assistance.

The EU’s institutional approach is based on peacebuilding, integration, and conditionality, though the depth and severity of its policy depend on the scale of the conflict and level of threat. In the case of Kosovo, the policy is one of balance and dialogue between the parties, without sanctions or coercion. In the case of Ukraine, it is one of support and deterrence of the aggressor, within the framework of the collective defence of European values and security.

Against the backdrop of Russia’s war in Ukraine and growing tensions between Serbia and Kosovo, there is a danger of renewed violent conflict in the Balkans. However, in our view, this is unlikely due to NATO’s presence in Kosovo.

There remains the problem of Ukraine’s recognition of Kosovo. British scholar Edward Joseph believes that Kyiv is in a unique position to strengthen the Western order by recognizing Kosovo. Ukrainian recognition could open the path for Pristina to join NATO, advance intensive diplomatic efforts between Serbia and Kosovo, and deal a serious blow to Vladimir Putin. Europe continues to refuse a unanimous recognition of the facts that led to Kosovo’s independence. Divergences over Kosovo fuel Russia’s war against Ukraine and the West. Rising instability in the Balkans reinforces Putin’s argument that the Western order is illusory and arbitrary. The stance of states that do not recognize Kosovo also enables Putin to use it as a “precedent” for dismembering Ukraine, while he and other Russian officials accuse the West of dismembering Serbia. For Putin, Kosovo embodies the grievance against the West that underpins his justification for the war against Ukraine [7].

Conclusions

The comparative analysis of Serbia’s policy towards Kosovo and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine makes it possible to identify a number of common features in the strategies of both states, as well as fundamental differences in their nature, scale, and consequences for international security.

A key similarity lies in the use of revisionist historical narratives aimed at delegitimizing the sovereignty of the other side and legitimizing their own territorial claims. Both Serbia and Russia actively exploit historical myths—Serbia focusing on the sacralization of Kosovo as the “cradle of Serbian statehood,” and Russia promoting the concept of the “Russian World” and appropriating the legacy of Kyivan Rus’. These narratives are supplemented by cultural, religious, and linguistic arguments, which are presented as indisputable historical truths but in reality serve as political instruments.

A second common feature is the appeal to the protection of ethnic minorities as a justification for political positions and, in Russia’s case, military aggression. In both instances, this argument is used to shape a victimization discourse, portraying their respective states as defenders of “oppressed compatriots.”

However, the differences are fundamental:

• Serbia operates mainly within diplomatic and legal frameworks, participating in negotiations and avoiding the use of armed force since 1999. Despite its refusal to recognize Kosovo’s independence, Serbia maintains EU candidate status and seeks to balance national interests with the strategic goal of European integration.
• Russia, by contrast, has chosen the path of large-scale military aggression, grossly violating the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, and the basic principles of the international order. The annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbas, and the full-scale invasion of 2022 demonstrate a deliberate attempt to destroy Ukrainian statehood and fundamentally revise post-Cold War geopolitical realities.

The informational component plays a decisive role in both cases. Russia and Serbia employ hybrid strategies involving the manipulation of historical memory, the spread of disinformation, and the formation of an image of “historical injustice” in need of correction. These narratives are designed not only for domestic mobilization but also to influence the international arena, seeking to create a favourable environment for the realization of strategic goals.

The positions of the United States and the European Union towards these conflicts differ in intensity and unity. In the case of Kosovo, the EU follows a policy of balancing the parties and promoting dialogue, while the U.S. provides security guarantees and long-term support for Pristina. In the case of Ukraine, both the EU and the U.S. have taken an unequivocal stance in support of Kyiv, combining large-scale assistance with sanctions pressure on Russia.

In a broader geopolitical context, both the Serbian and Russian cases reflect the challenges posed by revisionist states to the stability of the international system. While Serbia’s approach remains within the realm of diplomatic competition, Russia’s actions represent an existential threat to the foundations of international security.

The academic value of this comparison lies in demonstrating that even conflicts of differing scales and intensities can be underpinned by similar ideological constructs and discursive mechanisms. Understanding these mechanisms is essential for developing effective strategies to counter manipulative historical narratives and to strengthen the principles of international law, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

Therefore, the international community must:

1. Systematically expose and refute falsified historical narratives used for political purposes;
2. Support educational and public diplomacy initiatives aimed at fostering critical thinking and historical awareness;
3. Strengthen mechanisms for preventing hybrid threats and information warfare;
4. Promote inclusive diplomatic formats that prevent escalation and support peaceful resolution of disputes.

Only through coordinated action and the defence of universal norms can the global order be protected from the destructive influence of revisionist ideologies—regardless of whether they originate in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, or elsewhere.

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