Abstracto:

This paper examines three cases of espionage arrests in Kosovo, involving two Serbian individuals and two Albanians linked to the Serbian Information and Security Agency (BIA). The aim of these spies was to discredit the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), alter the narrative of the Reçak massacre, create a “yellow house” similar to the one in northern Albania, and destabilize the state of Kosovo by inciting interethnic conflicts. Through the analysis of specific cases and motivation theories, this paper sheds light on the reasons why individuals engage in espionage against their own country, Serbia’s efforts to manipulate the history and stability of the region and the tendencies to invade Kosovo.

Palabras clave: espionaje, BIA, AKI, UÇK, casa amarilla, Serbia, conflictos interétnicos, OTAN.

1. Introducción

The Kosovo Intelligence Agency (KIA), in cooperation with other security entities, has successfully uncovered and apprehended four spies connected to the Serbian Security Intelligence Agency (BIA). The arrests included two Serbian national and two ethnic Albanians, who were detained in two separate cases.

The primary objectives of the two ethnic Albanian individuals linked to BIA were to damage the reputation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), discredit the Reçak massacre, provoke interethnic conflicts, and sully NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. In 2009, three individuals connected to BIA were captured in Kosovo. Later, another individual was identified as a member of a group aiming to fabricate and compensate false witnesses concerning the alleged case of organ trafficking by the KLA. Surprisingly, this individual held official positions within the state apparatus of Kosovo.

Serbia has consistently engaged in espionage activities against Kosovo, and the recent revelations are just a small part of its operations. It has recently been uncovered that Russia, through Serbian agents, has also influenced politicians and institutions of the European Union. Therefore, these actions are well-planned and strategically targeted. To uncover the objectives of this country, we have engaged in studying recent cases and a 2009 espionage case, including the theoretical framework.

This study employs a qualitative research approach, analyzing specific cases of espionage arrests and investigative materials obtained from open sources. By combining the analysis of open sources, regional circumstances, and Serbia’s approach against Kosovo, the study aims to understand the motives and strategic goals of individuals involved in espionage. Theories of motivation, psychological and social factors are used to interpret the behaviors and decisions of the spies.

The research question of the paper is: “What are the main reasons and motivations that lead individuals to engage in espionage against their country, and how does this affect Serbia’s efforts to manipulate the history and stability of Kosovo?”

La variable dependiente del trabajo es: "Objetivos estratégicos de Serbia contra Kosovo a través del espionaje".

2.   Reasons Why People Engage in Espionage against Their Country

2.1. Teorías de la motivación

• Teoría de la elección racional: Esta teoría sugiere que los individuos toman decisiones basadas en sus intereses personales (Scott, 2000). En el contexto del espionaje, un individuo puede elegir trabajar para otro país si cree que los beneficios, como la ganancia económica o la promoción personal, compensan los riesgos y las posibles consecuencias.

• Teoría del intercambio social: Esta teoría afirma que los individuos adoptan comportamientos en función de las recompensas y los costes asociados a dichos comportamientos (Cropanzano y Mitchell, 2005). En el caso del espionaje, un individuo podría sopesar los beneficios potenciales (por ejemplo, ganancias económicas, satisfacción personal) frente a los costes (por ejemplo, consecuencias legales, ostracismo social) y decidir que los beneficios superan a los costes.

• Factores psicológicos: Factores psicológicos como el deseo de poder, un sentimiento de lealtad a otro país o una necesidad de emoción y aventura también pueden motivar a los individuos a dedicarse al espionaje (Wilder, 2017).

2.2. Factores adicionales

• Circunstancias personales: Las personas que se enfrentan a dificultades financieras, crisis personales u otros retos pueden ser más susceptibles a las promesas de ganancias financieras u otros beneficios ofrecidos por un gobierno extranjero.

• Lealtad e identidad: Los individuos que se sienten desvinculados de su país o tienen un fuerte sentimiento de lealtad hacia otro país pueden ser más proclives al espionaje.

• Oportunidad y facilidad: La disponibilidad de oportunidades y la facilidad de acceso a información sensible también pueden influir en la decisión de una persona de dedicarse al espionaje.

• Factores culturales y sociales: Factores culturales y sociales como la falta de orgullo nacional, el concepto de imagen poscolonial o el deseo de formar parte de una comunidad más amplia también pueden contribuir a que un individuo decida dedicarse al espionaje.

• Lavado de cerebro y manipulación: En algunos casos, las personas pueden ser coaccionadas o manipuladas para que participen en actividades de espionaje mediante manipulación psicológica, chantaje u otras formas de coacción.

3. Dos identidades, un espía

Since 2002, a Serbian spy, Marko Knezhevic, is suspected to have operated in Kosovo under the pseudonym “Drugi Crni”, posing as a journalist for “TV Most” based in Zvecan. On May 30, 2024, the Kosovo Police arrested Knezhevic following an investigation and discovery by the Kosovo Intelligence Agency. The arrest occurred due to Knezhevic’s use of dual identities, as his Serbian and Kosovar passports did not match (Teve, 2024).

This arrest sheds light on Serbia’s clandestine operations in Kosovo, highlighting the ongoing efforts of the Serbian country to undermine regional stability. Knezhevic’s involvement with “TV Most” highlights the strategic use of media to disseminate propaganda and manipulate public opinion. Posing as a journalist, he was able to gather intelligence and spread disinformation, serving Serbia’s interests and likely organizing and aiding terrorist groups such as the “Northern Brigades” and “Bridge Guards”. Knezhevic was a close associate who reported to Aleksandar Vulin, current Deputy Prime Minister in the Serbian government, former Minister of Internal Affairs, and former director of BIA.

The presence of advanced technological devices in Knezhevic’s possession suggests that Serbia has heavily invested in sophisticated surveillance and espionage tools. This underscores the country’s commitment to covert operations designed to compromise Kosovo’s security and sovereignty. Furthermore, Knezhevic’s dual identities in Kosovo and Serbian passports raise questions about the extent of Serbia’s infiltration into Kosovo’s social and institutional life.

This discovery has significant implications for regional security, suggesting that Serbia has been able to penetrate Kosovo’s structures and gather sensitive information.

4.   KIA uncovers two “Good Albanians” serving Serbia to distort the history of war

La Agencia de Inteligencia de Kosovo (AKI), tras una investigación y recopilación de datos incriminatorios,

has testified before the Supreme Court of Kosovo, engaging in legal actions leading to the arrest of two individuals, Bedri Shabani and Muharrem Qerimi, on charges of collaboration with the Serbian Information and Security Agency (BIA). Evidence gathered by KIA indicates that these individuals were actively undermining Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and the historical narrative of Kosovo’s war.

Se descubrió que Bedri Shabani, antiguo funcionario de aduanas durante el régimen de Slobodan Milosevic en la década de 1990, y Muharrem Qerimi, antiguo funcionario de la Policía de Kosovo hasta después de la declaración de independencia de Kosovo, que fue despedido de esta institución debido al uso indebido de un vehículo confiscado, mantenían contactos mutuos dentro del BIA, concretamente con Serdjan Rosic, un serbio de Ferizaj. Este último es un nombre conocido por el testimonio de Bogolub Janicevic en La Haya. El objetivo principal de estos detenidos era manipular pruebas y orquestar testigos contra el ELK.

Bedri Shabani, a former customs officer during Slobodan Milosevic’s regime in the 1990s, and Muharrem Qerimi, a former official of the Kosovo Police until after Kosovo’s independence declaration, who was dismissed from this institution due to misuse of a confiscated vehicle, were found to have mutual contacts within BIA, specifically with Serdjan Rosic, a Serbian from Ferizaj. The latter is a familiar name from Bogolub Janicevic’s testimony in The Hague. The primary goal of these detainees was to manipulate evidence and orchestrate witnesses against the KLA.

Bedri Shabani, in particular, has been actively involved in Serbia’s efforts to distort the history of the Reçak massacre. Serbia has continuously promoted its narrative that the Reçak massacre was staged by the KLA and the international community. The main objective of this historical revisionism is to undermine NATO’s intervention in Kosovo, prompted by the Reçak massacre and William Walker’s response. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was a response to the genocide perpetrated by the Serbian state against Albanians in Kosovo under Slobodan Milosevic’s leadership.

According to current information, Bedri Shabani played a significant role in this disinformation campaign. He attempted to create a replica of the “yellow house” similar to the one in northern Albania, fabricating a narrative that the KLA engaged in human organ trafficking. Shabani’s strategic aim was to link the former KLA military hospital in the village of Mollopolc, Shtime, with the Reçak massacre, as these two villages are geographically close.

Muharrem Qerimi se ha presentado sistemáticamente como agente de los servicios de inteligencia británicos. (T7, 2024)

4.1.         Discovery of Serbia’s Efforts to Distort Kosovo’s History

The recent arrest of Bedri Shabani and Muharrem Qerimi by the Kosovo Intelligence Agency (KIA) has shed light on Serbia’s ongoing efforts to distort Kosovo’s history and undermine its stability. These two individuals, suspected of working for the Serbian Information and Security Agency (BIA), were found to be actively involved in spreading disinformation and manipulating public opinion against Kosovo.

4.2. Background and Motivations

Shabani and Qerimi’s activities date back to the 1990s when they were employed in Serbian institutions, a time when Albanians were excluded from institutions and public life in former Yugoslavia. Shabani worked in Serbia’s regime as a customs officer and after the war primarily lived outside Kosovo, while Qerimi was dismissed from the Kosovo Police for misuse of a seized vehicle and later engaged in the real estate sector, presenting himself as someone powerful working for KIA or another intelligence service.

4.3. Objetivos y métodos

The primary goal of Shabani and Qerimi was to distort the history of the Reçak massacre, a key event in the Kosovo War. Serbia has continuously sought to impose its narrative that the massacre was staged by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the international community. Particularly, Shabani has been involved in this campaign, attempting to fabricate a “yellow house” similar to where the KLA is accused of trafficking human organs. His aim was the strategic alignment of the location and connection between the facility and the massacre with the former KLA military hospital in the village of Mollopolc, near Reçak.

4.4. Contactos y operaciones

Shabani y Qerimi mantenían contactos con el BIA tanto físicamente como por otros canales a través de Serdjan Rosic. Recientemente, habían intentado organizar un incidente étnico en Kosovo similar a los de los años ochenta, noventa o la posguerra. Esto sugiere que formaban parte de una red más amplia destinada a desestabilizar la región.

Implicaciones y consecuencias

La detención de Shabani y Qerimi tiene importantes implicaciones para la seguridad y la estabilidad de Kosovo. Sus actividades estaban diseñadas para perjudicar al Estado de Kosovo y socavar su reputación internacional. Además, su plan malicioso contra William Walker, figura clave de la comunidad internacional, pone de manifiesto el alcance de los esfuerzos de Serbia por manipular e intimidar.

4.5. Denegación por el BIA

La detención de Bedri Shabani y Muharrem Qerimi es un duro recordatorio de los continuos esfuerzos de Serbia por distorsionar la historia de Kosovo y socavar su estabilidad. La investigación de AKI ha descubierto una compleja red de desinformación y manipulación destinada a perjudicar a Kosovo y a su reputación internacional. La negación por parte de la BIA serbia de cualquier comunicación o colaboración con las dos personas detenidas (САОПШТЕЊЕ 05.06.2024. Безбедно-информативна Агенција, n.d.) es un claro indicio de su implicación en estas actividades y de su pánico ante la exposición y contraexposición de las intenciones serbias. La comunidad internacional debe permanecer vigilante y seguir apoyando a Kosovo en sus esfuerzos por contrarrestar las actividades desestabilizadoras de Serbia.

5.   Discovery of interceptions: Conspiracy for ethnical destabilization in Kosovo

In a published telephone interception by GeoPost, a conversation between Bedri Shabani and Serdjan Rosic reveals several key details, despite certain parts being censored. The conversation, though brief in its public release, provides us with significant insights:

• La conversación tuvo lugar un día después del incidente de Banjska, confirmado por las referencias a los acontecimientos del día anterior.
• Se habla claramente de incitar a incidentes étnicos, mencionando a otros que inflaman la situación, mientras echan leña al fuego para exacerbarla.
• Shabani pregunta a Rosic por el progreso de las "películas", lo que implica preparativos para diversos asuntos contra Kosovo.
• Shabani expresses concerns among his friends, suggesting there is a supportive group around him.
• Busca la aprobación de Rosic para incitar algo o para dejarlo "dormir".
• Rosic le asegura que transmitirá todas sus peticiones y palabras.
• La conversación se produjo desde Gracanica, ya que Shabani menciona haberse detenido allí para discutir antes de continuar el viaje a Pristina.
• Shabani tiene conexiones sospechosas con muchas personas, y menciona que no registra los números de teléfono, pero los recuerda (TheGeoPost, 2024).

GeoPost has also published a second interception of Bedri Shabani with Sedjan Rosic, where we obtain further new information:

• It is confirmed from the conversation that they physically met a few days before the interception in the city of Nis, Serbia on 17.05.2023.
• The phone call has happened on 23.05.2023, where it is learned that Rosic has professional connections with “another colleague”, Bogoljub Janicijevic, who in 1999 was the head of the so-called “Secretariat of Internal Affairs” for Ferizaj.
• Durante la conversación, se revela que el día de la reunión con la BIA en Nis, Shabani había entregado tres textos. El audio está censurado y se desconoce de qué textos se trata.
• A este respecto, Shabani había preguntado: "¿Ha tenido ocasión de verlos antes?", a lo que Rosic responde con un "no" (The GeoPost, 2024).

5.1. Análisis de la conversación

This telephone interception presents a clear and present danger to the internal stability of Kosovo. The discussion on ethnical incidents and preparations against Kosovo suggests a coordinated strategy for destabilization. The involvement of a supportive group around Shabani, who are concerned, indicates he has a wide network of collaborators who may be engaged in subversive activities.

La garantía de Rosic de transmitir las peticiones de Shabani indica una cooperación estrecha y eficaz entre ellos, lo que sugiere que estas actividades están bien organizadas y planificadas. El hecho de que la conversación tuviera lugar en Gracanica, una zona étnicamente sensible, y la mención del viaje hacia Pristina suscitan preocupación por la extensión de su influencia por toda la región.

The second interception reveals well-coordinated coordination and a detailed plan for destabilizing Kosovo. Physical meetings, professional connections with important Serbian security figures, and involvement of intelligence services suggest a significant risk to regional stability. These activities are meticulously planned and organized, demanding special attention from Kosovar and international authorities to prevent any further escalation of the situation.

5.2. Represalias de Serbia

In response to the arrest of BIA spies in Kosovo, Serbia appears to be employing a strategy of equivalence by arresting an individual from Leposavic, alleging that he betrayed his own people for 500 euros (Alo, 2024). Additionally, Serbia is fabricating other false information and disseminating it through pro-Vucic media outlets (Novosti, 2024).

6. Shpend y Muharrem Qerimi: el oscuro pasado de dos hermanos

Muharrem Qerimi, que fue detenido por la Policía de Kosovo por orden del fiscal tras la revelación de AKI como agente de la BIA, revela que su pasado y el de uno de sus hermanos han estado en conflicto con la ley. Muharrem Qerimi sirvió en la Policía de Kosovo como investigador de delitos graves hasta después de la declaración de independencia de Kosovo, pero debido al mal uso de su cargo oficial, fue despedido de la Policía.

Muharrem Qerimi’s brother, Shpend Qerimi, is in prison for an explosion at the Sekiraca nightclub many years ago and has been sentenced by the court to 25 years of imprisonment (IndeksOnline, 2024).

Este informe se basa únicamente en fuentes confirmadas, no presuntas.

7. Ex policía serbio, espía de la BIA

Un antiguo miembro de la Policía de Kosovo perteneciente a la comunidad serbia ha sido el último detenido por la Policía de Kosovo por orden del Fiscal Especial de Kosovo. Aleksandar Vlajic, tras una investigación de varios meses de la Agencia de Inteligencia de Kosovo, resultó estar al servicio de la BIA serbia (Dukagjini, 2024). Según el anuncio del fiscal, la detención tuvo lugar la noche del 26 de junio de 2024 (Dukagjini, 2024). Según información del Instituto OCTOPUS, además de compartir información con la BIA de Serbia, Vlajic también disponía de una amplia red de fuentes de información (Musliu, 2024). La red de espionaje de Vlajic se extendía a:

• Aduanas de Kosovo,
• ONG serbias,
• OSCE y UNMIK en el norte de Kosovo,
• Algunas organizaciones internacionales en Pristina, y
• Th e media in Gracanica (Musliu, 2024b).

8. Tres espías de la BIA: Detenidos por PK, Liberados por EULEX, Branislav Nikolic y otros

La Dirección contra la Delincuencia Organizada de la Policía de Kosovo detuvo en 2009 a tres serbios, dos de ellos de nacionalidad serbia y uno de Kosovo, en una operación llevada a cabo en Caglavica (Pristina). Igor Jucinac, Milutin Radanovic y Predrag Zheljkovic fueron sorprendidos comprando testigos dispuestos a declarar contra el ELK por el presunto caso de tráfico de órganos en la "casa amarilla", en el norte de Albania, donde se acusaba al ELK de traficar con órganos humanos.

According to interceptions and testimonies, they paid up to 100,000 euros to buy a witness who would falsely testify against the KLA. RTK had brought exclusive footage showing how these individuals were attempting to buy witnesses (RTK, 2020).

At that time, EULEX, utilizing its guaranteed competencies, took over the case from Kosovo Police and Courts, then released them to defend themselves in freedom, but the individuals had fled Kosovo and never returned.

Cómo fueron liberados sigue siendo un verdadero misterio, por qué el fiscal los liberó cuando estaban acusados de graves actos delictivos.

Igor Jocinac later apparently tried to return to Kosovo, but now as a healthcare worker, as he was found in the payroll list of the hospital in Sterpce, which was not functional but where 21 people were paid (Insider, 2019).

Branislav Nikolic’s involvement in this campaign against the KLA was also revealed. The latter is the brother of Bratislav Nikolic, who was mayor of Sterpce.

Bratislav Nikolic became mayor of Sterpce in 2009 with the Independent Liberal Party led by Slobodan Petrovic. In 2010, there was an attack on Nikolic’s house in Sterpce (B92, 2010). After the creation of the Serbian List with the Brussels Agreement, Nikolic moved to this political entity and in September 2015, Nikolic announced that about 3,000 citizens of Sterpce joined the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) of Aleksandar Vucic and the Serbian List, saying that the then Prime Minister of Serbia and SNS President, Aleksandar Vucic, “deals with specific problems of citizens, had difficult Brussels negotiations and secured the formation of the Serbian Community of Municipalities” (Spalovic, 2015).

Al parecer, Bratislav había influido para que su hermano Branislav ascendiera a diversos cargos en Kosovo. Branislav fue nombrado miembro del Consejo de Administración de Correos de Kosovo por decisión de 2012 (Insider, 2019). Luego fue nombrado en 2016 asesor del expresidente de Kosovo Hashim Thaci, pero fue destituido en junio de 2019 tras menos de cuatro años de trabajo, tras revelarse que formaba parte del BIA (Voa, 2019).

Branislav Nikolic, como candidato a diputado con la Lista Serbia para la Asamblea de Kosovo, consiguió en 2019 ser diputado legalmente a falta de una decisión judicial sobre su culpabilidad o inocencia (Koha, 2019).

9. Conclusión

El caso del 24 de septiembre de 2023, en el que Serbia lanzó un ataque terrorista en el norte de Kosovo con el objetivo de devolver esa zona al control de los grupos terroristas dirigidos por Radojicic y declararla después zona autónoma, indica que el espectro de participación en estas acciones es amplio y mucho mayor que el mero caso de Banjska.

With the revelation of interceptions involving Bedri Shabani and Srdjan Rosic, we discover that Serbia’s ambitions extend beyond just taking northern Kosovo; they aim to encompass the entire northeastern part of Kosovo. Therefore, it is no coincidence that they have established 48 military bases along the entire border with Kosovo.

Serbia has not relinquished its claim over all of Kosovo’s territory, and in its ambitions, the ideal achievement would be the reconquest of Kosovo as a whole. However, realistically, they aim at least for northeastern Kosovo and possibly to annex the rest to Albania as a diminished territory. Hence, we can expect escalations of conflicts like those of Banjska or ethnic conflicts in other parts of Kosovo, as evidenced by Serbia’s goals heard in interceptions involving Shabani and Rosic.

Por lo tanto, no es casualidad que también tengamos la declaración del Presidente serbio Aleksandar Vucic de que esperarán a que cambien las circunstancias geopolíticas en relación con la cuestión de Kosovo. De este modo, esperan una escalada de los conflictos mundiales y un cambio en el equilibrio de fuerzas y los intereses mundiales.

Sin embargo, la consecución de estos planes estratégicos requiere acciones estratégicas a través de la guerra híbrida, y Serbia está empleando estos medios a múltiples niveles.

The case of Dick Marty, the drafter of the document alleging crimes by the KLA involving human organ trafficking in the “yellow house” in northern Albania, adds a new dimension to this complex situation. In 2020, Marty faced serious death threats from Serbian BIA, according to Swiss security authorities (SwissInfo, 2024). Although the BIA denied the assassination attempt on Marty (Vasques, 2022), as it denied its connections to the spies arrested in Kosovo, Marty continued to be protected by Swiss security forces, and his exits were under strict security, ultimately leading to his death in December 2023. Serbia’s aim in this assassination was to blame Albanians for Marty’s murder and thus further falsify facts about staged crimes for organ trafficking. Marty himself acknowledged the existence of this plan (SwissInfo, 2024).

This case illustrates that Serbia is willing to sacrifice anyone to achieve its objectives against Kosovo. In addition to Dick Marty’s case, we have their malign intentions towards William Walker, their readiness to sacrifice Serbs to stir up ethnic conflict in Kosovo, and the embezzlement of Serbian people’s money to create false propaganda through hybrid warfare.

Tras repasar los acontecimientos presentados en el documento, queda claro que Serbia tiene varios objetivos importantes dentro de su agenda estratégica:

1. Reformulating the narrative of the Reçak Massacre: Serbia seeks to rewrite the historical cause of the Reçak Massacre, presenting it as an act committed by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), thereby absolving itself of responsibility.
   1. Discrediting NATO’s humanitarian intervention: Serbia aims to undermine NATO’s intervention legitimacy after the Reçak Massacre and other massacres, presenting it as a conspiracy against Serbia and questioning its justification.
   1. Delegitimizing Kosovo’s independence: By leaving aside the ICJ decision, Serbia seeks to undermine Kosovo’s legitimacy, arguing that international law has been violated.
   1. Victimización y revisionismo histórico: Serbia pretende presentar a su población como víctimas de genocidios pasados, especialmente el genocidio nazi y las acciones de la Ustase croata contra los serbios. Al hacer hincapié en estos acontecimientos históricos, Serbia pretende generar simpatía y apoyo internacionales a sus acciones en la región.

Thus, Serbia’s short-term and medium-term goals are designed to discredit and weaken the actions of Western powers, including NATO’s 1999 humanitarian intervention against Serbian military actions aimed at stopping genocide in Kosovo. This manipulation of the narrative aims to construct an alternative international history that aligns with Serbia’s interests, with encouragement from Russia and China to sully the actions of the USA, NATO, and Western countries worldwide and to strengthen the BRICS group.

While we have mentioned the long-term goals at the beginning of the conclusions. Serbia with the discovery of spies appears to be severely shaken due to the fact that it is revealed about their terrorist goals like in the Banjska case last year

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