Assoc. Prof. Dr. Arben Fetoshi

Based on the initiative and the ongoing debate in Germany regarding a political party that is considered a threat to democratic consensus, the political system, and the fundamental values of the European Union—where Germany plays a leading role—this analysis examines the case of the Serbian List in Kosova in light of its similarities and differences with Alternative for Germany (AfD). Although they operate in different contexts—the first, as an extension of Belgrade’s official policy, exploiting Kosova’s ‘privileges’ to undermine its statehood, and the second as an ‘extremist organization’ taking advantage of Germany’s ‘privileges’ to challenge the liberal order and Western structures—they share common ideological, discursive, and methodological elements in the pursuit of their objectives. Their approach to the West, nationalism, democratic institutions, and strategies for citizen mobilization aligns both with anti-liberal and pro-Russian agendas.

Political Context

The Serbian List is a political entity established in 2013 with the blessing of official Belgrade, ostensibly to represent the interests of the Serb community in Kosova. In practice, however, it functions as an instrument of the Serbian government, carrying out directives and engaging in activities aimed against the Republic of Kosova. Its operations are focused on undermining the authority of Kosova’s institutions and instrumentalizing Serb citizens in pursuit of this objective. The party enjoys public support from the Kremlin and embodies the strategic meaning of the Serbo-Russian alliance in the Balkans.

The Alternative for Germany (AfD) is a political party founded in 2013 that has steadily gained momentum by hardening its far-right rhetoric—targeting immigration, the European Union, and multiculturalism as one of the core values of Western societies. Its political agenda revolves around challenging the liberal-democratic consensus and the traditional institutions of the German system. Certain segments of the party have well-documented ideological and financial ties to the Kremlin, fueling growing concerns about Russian influence within German politics.

Similarities:

Based on their methods, discourse, and political ideology, the similarities observed between these entities are not tactical coincidences in the struggle for power, but rather reflect a broader strategy aimed at advancing the rise of political forces in Europe and the Balkans that undermine democratic order and Western institutions, creating space for Russia’s geopolitical interests.

  • Victimhood
    The Serbian List serves as a tool within Serbia’s hybrid strategy of victimhood, pushing the narrative that Serb citizens in Kosova are persecuted by the institutions—thereby advancing Serbia’s objective of obstructing Kosova’s international consolidation.
    The AfD likewise employs victimhood as a political strategy, but to stir emotional sentiment among Germans, fostering the belief that they are marginalized within their own society due to immigration and liberal policies.
  • Nationalism
    Both parties rely on a form of ethno-cultural nationalism, presenting their national identities as being under threat. The Serbian List, through the deceptive narrative “Kosova—the cradle of Serbia,” frames the effort to reclaim Kosova as a national identity struggle. Meanwhile, the AfD uses “arguments” that European integration undermines sovereignty and that immigration policies pose a threat to the security of the German people.
  • Anti-Western Orientation
    Both reject the current international rules-based order. The Serbian List is actively engaged in opposing Kosova’s statehood and its Euro-Atlantic orientation, while the AfD is a Eurosceptic party with increasingly harsh positions against European integration and Germany’s political consensus. In line with Russian narratives, both depict Western institutions as corrupt and harmful to national sovereignty.
  • Closeness to Russia
    The Serbian List openly operates in service of Serbia’s hybrid strategy and receives explicit support from the Kremlin, representing Serbia’s strategic alliance with Russia in the Balkans. Similarly, certain segments of the AfD express support for Kremlin policies and advocate for a new world order as an alternative to the West.
  • Exploitation of Crises
    The Serbian List constantly uses the tensions in northern Kosova to increase its influence and mobilize the support of Serbian citizens, hindering their integration.

The AfD constantly uses the crises related to migrants and extremist or Islamic attacks as a strategy to increase its influence and mobilize citizen support.

Differences:

While the AfD has shown alarming growth among voters in Germany, but it is not limited to representing a minority community, while the Serbian List was created with the blessing of Serbia to serve its agenda against the Republic of Kosova.

The AfD is not a political force that seeks to undermine the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Germany, whereas the Serbian List is a political instrument operating within Kosova, securing seats reserved for the Serb community, funded by Kosova’s state budget, and openly fight against its independence. Beyond its hegemonic discourse, which reflects Serbia’s official positions, its former deputy leader, Milan Radoiçiq, led the terrorist attack against Kosova in Banjska, Zveçan in September 2023. Despite international calls for his prosecution, he continues to move freely in Serbia.

On May 2, 2025, Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) officially classified the AfD as a “far-right extremist organization.” It now faces a national debate on whether it should be banned.

Meanwhile, the Serbian List continues to benefit from state “privileges” in Kosova, including public funds (270,000 euros from the Political Parties Support Fund) and nine seats in the Kosova Assembly.

The Political Paradox

The Serbian List and the AfD are broadly similar in terms of their relationship with Russia, posing a serious threat to democratic order and Western interests. However, they differ in the nature and context in which they operate. The first, is a political instrument that actively undermines the state of Kosova while continuing to benefit from its institutional “privileges,” whereas the second is an “extremist organization” that undermine democratic stability within Germany. The debate over whether to outlaw the AfD reflects a level of political awareness in Germany regarding the serious threats arising from current geopolitical developments.

By analogy with Germany’s approach, Kosova too must address the threat posed by the Serbian List—but through a careful approach that takes into account the specifics related to the normalization dialogue. In the case of the Serbian List, a comprehensive approach is necessary—one that includes a rational public debate aimed at raising awareness of the political paradox (operates within the state of Kosova and actively fighting its very existence), as well as rigorous monitoring of its discourse and actions that undermine Kosova’s constitutional order. Such an approach would entail an initial phase of warning (the BfV’s decision allows for strict measures of surveillance and oversight), followed by appropriate institutional actions toward a potential ban—while carefully managing the political cost in a way that benefits the state of Kosova.

The author is Director of the Institute for Hybrid Warfare Studies “Octopus”

Share.