Close Menu
Saturday, February 22
Full Publications Gurakuç Kuçi - Senior ResearcherBy

STRATEGIC PUTIN’S PLAN: WHAT ARE THE REAL GOALS OF CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA?

Download

Dr. Iryna Synelnyk
Researcher at Institute for Hybrid Warfare Studies “OCTOPUS”
iryna.synelnyk@octopusinstitute.org

Abstract

This paper deals with Russia’s declared and real goals in Ukraine during the war, which has been going on since 2014, and Russia’s interests in expanding its influence in European countries. This topic has been covered by many contemporary media in Russia, Ukraine and Western countries, therefore we have made an attempt to analyze this information through a content-analyze, summarizing some findings of analytical centers and some Ukrainian and Western experts. Special attention is paid to the ideological basis of modern Russian aggression and attempts to form an anti-Western coalition.

Keywords: Russia’s expansion, Ukraine, war, peace negotiations, anti-Western coalition, security.

Introduction

The President of Russia Vladimir Putin began the full-scale invasion in Ukraine by declaring its goal to be ‘denazification’ and ‘demilitarization’, which was not widely understood, and calling it a ‘special military operation’. He later claimed that the operation would not end until its strategic goals had been achieved.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the announced and real goals of Russia’s war in Ukraine, for which the Russian leadership uses economic and human resources, based on statements by Russian and Ukrainian presidents and expert commentary. This paper also focuses on issues of Russia’s destabilising actions in Poland, the Baltic States and the Balkans.

The research question of the paper is: What are Russia’s declaration and real aims of the war in Ukraine?

What are Russia’s statements about peace talks hiding?

How is Russia creating an anti-Western coalition and what kind of global security architecture is it proposing?

The dependent variable is: The geopolitical influence of Russia, attempts to extend its political impact to neighboring countries and build a new ally with non-democratic states.

Hypothesis: 1. The Russian political elite, led by President Vladimir Putin, has imperial ambitions, seeking to maintain its dominance especially in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, and to expand its influence in European countries, especially Poland, the Balkans and the Baltic states. 2. The more Russia continues its efforts to build an anti-Western coalition, the greater the likelihood of increased tensions between autocratic Russia and Western democracies.  

The research method of this study is based on a wide range of information sources and analytical techniques. The main focus of this method is on:

  • The collection and analysis of Russia’s actions against Ukraine during the war and influence of the people in the post-Soviet countries and the Western world.
  • Geopolitical analysis through Russia’s attempts to influence in different regions of the world and the strengthening of the BRICS group.
  • Analysis of the prospects for ending the war and possible peace talks between Russia and Ukraine.
  • Analysis of hybrid warfare.

The research methodology is based on a comprehensive analysis of various aspects of the contemporary war in Ukraine. The approach consists of an in-depth study of literary sources, documents, analysis of scientific works, articles in Ukrainian, Russian and Western media, reports and case studies related to the contemporary Russian war in Ukraine and the hybrid war waged by Russia in European countries. Initially, the interpretation of data was based on speeches by leaders, interviews, newspaper reports, public statements by officials and other printed sources.

The paper conducts an official discourse analysis focusing on past and current discourse, with particular attention to the statements of Ukrainian and Russian leaders Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Vladimir Putin. In order to collect and analyze the information, we used multidisciplinary scientific methods from the different fields of law, history, political science, philosophy, social communication and others.

Proclaimed and real goals of the Russia’s war in Ukraine

Historically, everything that the Russian authorities declare and what they do is totally different. So, a German politician and statesman Otto von Bismarck in the 19th century said that agreements with Russians are not worth the paper they are signed on ( Kralyuk, 2019). The current war in Ukraine is a bright example of connection between direct lies and sophisticated propaganda.

The 24th of February 2022, starting the full-scale invasion in Ukraine, the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin said that his country was acting in self-defense, that ‘its goal was the demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine, and claimed that Russia had no plans to occupy Ukrainian land and called the Ukrainian army to lay down their arms’ (Radio Liberty, 2022). Russian goals were announced in an appeal on the state television before the Russian Army crossed the Ukraine’s borders, days after supporting independence for eastern Ukrainian territories occupied by Russian proxies forces since 2014 the so-called Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republic. 

He also vowed to protect people from eight years of Ukrainian bullying and genocide – a Russian propaganda claim with no foundation in reality. The messages of Russian propaganda about ‘eight years bombing the children on Donbass’ repeated many Russians to their Ukrainian relatives who tried to explain that the Russian army had started a real war. Putin spoke of preventing NATO from gaining a foothold in Ukraine, then added another objective of ensuring Ukraine’s neutral status. Actions of the Russians Army Putin didn’t name the war. He talks only about a ‘special military operation’ (SMO or SVO – in Russian version) in Ukraine (Adamovich, 2022).  All time he is continuing to avoid the term ‘war’. In December 2023,  Putin vowed to fight on in Ukraine until Moscow secures the country’s ‘demilitarization’, ‘denazification’ and neutrality, unless Kyiv accepts a deal that achieves those goals (Kirby, 2023).

By the way, Yale historian Timothy Snyder described the charge of denazification as a perversion of values, telling CNN that it is ‘meant to confound us and discourage us and confuse us, but the basic reality is that Putin has everything turned around’. He said Putin’s goal appears to be to take Kyiv, arrest Ukraine’s political and civil leaders to get them out of power and then try them in some way (Snyder, 2022). For his point of view, that’s where the language of genocide comes in. The same thoughts have other experts. For example, Thomas Graham, a senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff during the George W. Bush administration, considers that at a minimum Putin wanted to destroy Ukraine’s military infrastructure and replace its government with a puppet regime (Politico, 2022, Graham).

Even in 2024, Russian journalists recognized that the words ‘denazification and demilitarization’ that Putin used in early 2022 proved to be incomprehensible to Russians. Thirty-two months have passed since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the ‘goals of the Armed Forces’ remain an unclear rhetorical formula repeated by the Russian authorities (Surnacheva, 2024). No one has yet provided details on what exactly these goals are.

Timothy Frye, the Marshall D. Shulman professor of post-Soviet foreign policy at Columbia University, at the beginning of the war in Ukraine emphasized that Putin would like to break the government in Kyiv, install a friendly regime that is demilitarized and neutral and then turn to bargaining with NATO over new security arrangements that would be more friendly to Moscow (Politico, 2022, Frye). These arrangements might include restrictions on troops and weapons in the NATO countries that joined after 1997 and steps to turn Ukraine into a vassal state. Putin likely believed that using overwhelming force against Ukraine would give him greater leverage in these negotiations despite the great costs that will be imposed on Moscow. Therefore, we can assume that there are no ‘SVO targets’, they will be exactly what Putin sees fit to declare as his victory for the moment he decides to stop the war.

Offers of the peace negotiations VS desire to completely control of Ukraine

The war in Ukraine has been continuing for three years. Obviously, Putin will seek to extend control of the four regions that he has declared to be a part of Russia, not just the Donbas but Zaporizhzhia and Herson regions.    

Some experts think that Russia would have then fully controlled the Azov Sea and the entire north shore of the Black Sea, turning a rump Ukraine into a landlocked country. In any event, the main lines of advance during the invasion have suggested Putin had far greater territorial ambitions (Graham, 2024). But Putin is not prepared to relent in the effort to achieve his goals. It is the task of Ukraine and the West to ensure that he does not succeed.

The first attempts to negotiate between Ukraine and Russia had made 2022 in Belarus and Turkey without any success. In the first version of the ‘peace treaty’, Russia insisted on the complete disarmament of Ukraine under its unlimited control, the isolation of the country from the Western aid, and the deployment of its troops in the occupied territories for long-term control. This conclusion was reached by journalists from the investigative project ‘System’ who received the documents from the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations (Surnacheva, 2024).

That year, during the G20 Summit in Indonesia the Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky said that the time has come to end Russia’s destructive war and save thousands of lives. He noted that it is not necessary to offer Ukraine compromises with conscience, sovereignty, territory and independence. At the same time, according to him, Ukraine has proposals that must be implemented in order to end the aggressive Russian war as soon as possible and justly (Bogdanyok, 2022). This formula includes on the issues of radiation and nuclear safety, food and energy safety, release of all prisoners and deportees, implementation of the UN Charter and restoration of territorial integrity of Ukraine, withdrawal of Russian troops and cessation of hostilities, restoring justice, anti-ecocide, avoiding  escalation and fixing the end of the war.

The war, which has been going on for three years, encourages Ukrainians not to rule out the possibility of peace negotiations. An opinion poll released by the Dzerkalo Tyzhnia (Mirror of Week) Ukrainian news outlet in mid-July 2024 showed that 44 percent of Ukrainians are ready for peace talks – the highest such number since the full-scale Russian invasion began in February 2022. Only 23 percent of Ukrainians wanted such talks in May 2023, according to a similar poll (Vedernikova, 2024).

In recent months, the Ukrainian president has been cautiously talking about peace talks with Moscow. In mid-July 2024, Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Russia should be invited to the second round of a peace summit in Switzerland (Mirovalev, 2024). Russian diplomats were not invited to the first round, which took place in the resort of Burgenstock in mid-June and was attended by representatives of 92 nations. Lately, Zelenskyy told the BBC that ‘not all [occupied] territories should be returned by force’. ‘The power of diplomacy may help’, he added. The new Ukrainian peace’s plan was presented by Zelensky to the Ukrainian parliament in October.  ‘The plan for victory is to strengthen our positions, and it depends on our partners, not on Russia, because Putin is not looking for an honest peace’, the Ukrainian president said (BBC, 2024). It contains a Ukrainian point of view on geopolitical, military, economic, and security issues.  One of the points involves inviting Ukraine to join NATO as a guarantee of security.

In July 2024, the Kremlin said it is open to negotiations with Ukraine to bring an end to Russia’s ongoing war of aggression against its neighbor but says it needs clarification on ‘how ready Kyiv is’ to participate in peace talks. ‘Russia as a whole is open to the negotiation process, but first we need to understand how ready Ukraine, the Ukrainian side, is for this, and how much the Ukrainian side has, let’s say, permission from its curators, because so far you see, very very different statements are being made, and it is not entirely clear yet’, Dmitry Peskov, press secretary for Russian President Vladimir Putin, claimed (Euronews, 2024).

At the same time, analytics of the Institute for the Study of War are sure that Kremlin rhetoric and Russian military actions illustrate that Putin remains uninterested in meaningful negotiations and any settlement that would prevent him from pursuing the destruction of an independent Ukrainian state although the Western media continues to report that Russian President Vladimir Putin is interested in a negotiated ceasefire in Ukraine (ISW, 2024). 

They consider that the Kremlin will continue to feign interest in negotiations at critical moments in the war to influence Western decision-making on support for Ukraine and to continue efforts to extract preemptive concessions from the West. The position of Ukraine has not been changed  because the authorities in Kyiv have repeatedly stated that the only acceptable peace offer would include a complete withdrawal of Russian troops from all occupied areas, including Crimea, which Moscow unilaterally annexed 10 years ago.

Despite Russia’s desire for Ukraine’s neutral status, the invitation of Ukraine to NATO is the first point of the ‘victory plan’. According to President Zelenskyy, this is what will ensure geopolitical certainty in Europe. He said this at the Ukraine-Southeast Europe Summit (UNIAN, 2024, Saenko). Zelenskyy spoke about the ‘victory plan’ that he has already presented to US President Joe Biden and is now presenting to other leaders, and noted that if fully implemented, Russia would lose the ability to threaten Ukraine or anyone else in Europe.

By the way, some experts suggest that Ukraine and Russia might have secret negotiations. For example, the Washington Post reported that Ukraine and Russia were set to send delegations to Qatar to negotiate a landmark agreement halting strikes on energy and power infrastructure on both warring sides (The Washington Post, 2024). The Qataris serving as mediators have been meeting separately with the Ukrainian and Russian delegations, but the negotiations were derailed by Ukraine’s surprise incursion into Russia’s western Kursk region, according to the officials.

Russia’s expanding and circle of interest in European countries 

Russian aggression in Ukraine has had an influence on the neighboring countries, some of them as Ukraine were part of the USSR before, another belongs to the sphere of Russian interests. Obviously, the debate about Russia’s objectives in different regions has been about whether it seeks outright territorial expansion or merely political influence.

The Baltic States

Talking about the Baltic countries we should take into account the population of Russians in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania which is near 900.000 people and is a heritage of the Soviet occupation. In Estonia and Latvia, Russians make up one-third of the local populations. If Putin  started the war  in Ukraine for the goals of the protection of Russian speaking people, he could begin the same campaign in the Baltic countries. But the main difference is that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are members of the EU and NATO. This fact is a deterrent for Russia’s aggressive policy. At the same time, Russia considers the independence of the Baltic states and their active role in European and Euro-Atlantic institutions as threats to Russia’s security, sovereignty, and autonomy.

The Baltic states are considered targets not because the Russians believe that these states can be returned to Russia’s sphere of influence. Rather, Russia uses the Baltic states to exert leverage against a variety of other actors, including the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union (Galeotti, 2019). Generally, Russia has financial and people resources for creating the point of tension in the region.

In 2023, the LRT investigating team did an investigation about Russia’s secret plan for the Baltic states. The documents which journalists dealt with were dated 2021 and  prepared by the Russian president’s office (LRT, 2023).

The plans for each Baltic country consist of two parts. The first one describes threats to Russian interests and the second one sets out steps to address them. Political, military, military-technical and security objectives, trade and economic objectives, and finally humanitarian or social objectives are in turn divided into three different time frames: short-term (until 2022), medium-term (2025) and long-term (2030).

 These documents show Moscow’s plans for maintaining influence in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. These include funding pro-Russian NGOs, efforts to keep Russian language in schools and oppose demolitions of Soviet monuments. However, the focus of the strategy paper for the Baltic states is also countering NATO (LRT – investigation, 2023). The Baltic states are supporting Ukraine’s fight against Russia at various levels, because they understand that the Kremlin’s aggressive policy could spread to their territory.

Poland

Poland as a neighboring European country has demonstrated substantial support for Ukraine during this war accepting refugees and providing humanitarian and military aid. Historically, Poland and Russia didn’t have a friendly relationship. And now Poland is one of the main countries of the anti-Putin bloc.

Polish experts don’t believe that Russian aggression against Poland as a NATO’s member is possible in the near future, but Poland significantly increases its army (until 300.000), purchases and produces weapons. Polish authorities have plans to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP and relies primarily on its own weapons production.

Russia is waging a hybrid war against NATO, against the EU, against Poland, without the participation of troops. But this hybrid war is a big problem, convinced Waldemar Skrzyczak, General of the Polish Armed Forces, Commander of the Army in 2006-2009 (Volosatska, 2024).

Polish experts are sure that Poland’s security directly depends on Ukraine’s defense capabilities – some Polish politicians and experts, and therefore military assistance to Ukraine will continue. Because Ukraine is continuing to fight against Russia including in the interests of Poland.

At the same time, Russian politics allow them to threaten Poland. The former president and prime minister of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, has threatened that if the United States allows Ukraine to use the transferred weapons to attack Russian targets, Russia will create a ‘guaranteed sanitary zone’ that could be located on the border with Poland or in Poland (Kurnosov, 2024).

Polish experts are sure that Russia is a terrorist state and country which is supporting terrorism in general. This is the threat that Polish General Roman Polko considers most likely in the near future: ‘I believe that we should not expect an attack (by Russia on Poland) in the coming years, but rather fear terrorist, sabotage, hybrid attacks with ‘demographic weapons’. We are already losing the cyber war, and the information war as well’ (Kurnosov, 2024).

Russia’s hybrid war against Poland is going on. For example, from 2022 Russia propaganda has been sharing the message that Poland is preparing to annex territories in western Ukraine.

Balkan countries

Historically, Russiasees the Balkan as its sphere of  influence where some countries, notably Serbia, have common ground such as the Orthodox Church, culture and geopolitical links. Contemporary Russian experts said that the Balkans are important for Russia–Europe, Russia–EU and Russia–NATO relations. In the future, from their point of view, this region could occupy an important place in the emerging architecture of relations with two of Russia’s neighbors: China and Turkey. 

The people of many countries in this region are culturally close and politically sympathetic to Russia, and they are concentrated not only in Serbia, but also in other countries as well (Russia in the Balkans). Consequently, this is where Russia’s position can find ‘the greatest understanding and support’, without taking into account the Muslim population in the Balkans and the existing opposition to the spread of Russian influence.

Therefore, Russia resents the region’s push for integration with the EU and NATO, and seeks to use persistent ethnic and religious fault lines to undermine these efforts. On the one hand, Serbia, Russia’s main partner, wants to be part of the EU, but on the other hand, it continues to support Russia, and didn’t join the European sanctions against Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine (UNIAN, 2024, Kurti). Serbia’s claims of a ‘pro-Western’ rapprochement and its commitment to European integration are, in fact, part of a sophisticated diplomatic game within the framework of a hybrid war orchestrated by Russia. This manipulation aims to undermine the structures of the European Union and NATO from within, creating divisions and institutional weaknesses in the face of authoritarian influences (Musliu, Kuci, 2024).

Russia is also using the Kosovo problem in its interests. Kosovo gained independence from Serbia in 2008, but Serbia still does not recognize Kosovo as an independent country. Russia positions itself as the guardian of Serbian interests regarding Kosovo and Serbian minorities in neighboring countries (Panasytska, 2022).

In addition, the Russian government mobilizes the state-controlled companies, including the energy giant Gazprom and the state-owned bank Sberbank to make investments across the region that it calculates will increase its political influence (McBride, 2023). Moscow has also proved adept at blurring the lines between official and unofficial state actions, often channeling its support through proxies. It cultivates influence through a range of non-state channels, such as support for clubs, schools, sports teams, religious centers, media outlets, and veterans groups etc.

In general, Serbia’s ‘pro-Western’ positioning aimed at lobbying for its interests as a well-planned Russian-Serbian strategy. This strategy aims to deceive international actors and create the conditions for the territorial division of Kosovo and its eventual dissolution as a state (Musliu, Kuci, 2024). Among other things, this would pave the way for the strong return of Russian influence in the Western Balkans, where Russia has already expanded its presence through hybrid warfare in most countries of the region.

By using Serbia and its interests in Bosnia and Kosovo, Russia has succeeded to incite tensions and to provoke destabilization through pro-russian and pro-serbian politicians Milorad Dodik, Milan Radojçiç and the criminal structures supported by Vuçiç. A strategy that would be followed by an open conflict with the potential for expansion, would lead to the collapse of the Western architecture for peace and security in the region, creating opportunities for a strategic position of Russia vis-à-vis Europe and NATO (Fetoshi, 2024).

Russian and Serbian disinformation campaigns are often targeted at multiple countries and spread across the region, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, and North Macedonia. The Balkans have long been a source of tension between Russia and the West. The war in Ukraine could change the calculus. Russia’s hybrid influence in the Balkans poses an imminent threat to ignite another war in Europe, destabilise the region and divert Western attention from Ukraine.

New architecture of security in the world. Russia’s anti-Western coalition

While the war in Ukraine lasted for three years and the Western world continued to support the Ukrainians in their struggle, Russia began to make new allies and to cooperate more closely with Asian, African and Latin American countries. While Western leaders are considering how much aid to offer Ukraine so as not to provoke Putin, Russia is diligently assembling an alternative coalition to counter the West (Ukrinform, 2023).

In December 2023, the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said in a press conference that there are no signs that Putin is preparing for peace. Instead, the Kremlin is preparing for a long and grinding war. Putin has put the Russian economy on a war footing. He is ramping up weapons production. And he is becoming more reliant on China, Iran and North Korea for weapons (NATO, 2023).  He considered if Putin wins in Ukraine, there is a real risk that his aggression will not end there. And the Western allies’ support is not charity. It is an investment in their security.

But Putin wanted to demonstrate for the Russian people and foreign audience that the Western sanctions don’t work and he organized the BRICS Summit in Kasan which the Kremlin has called it one of the ‘largest-scale foreign policy events ever’ in Russia. BRICS stands for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The grouping, often referred to as a counterweight to the Western-led world, has expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates. All of these countries account for 45% of the global population. Added together, members’ economies are worth more than $28.5tn (£22tn). That’s around 28% of the global economy (Rosenberg, 2024).

In Kazan, Vladimir Putin’s task was to skim over the differences and paint a picture of unity, while showing the Russian public – and the international community – that his country is far from isolated. The declaration of the summit does not contain notes about military cooperation but proposes a BRICS cross-border payment system. We recognise the widespread benefits of faster, low cost, more efficient, transparent, safe and inclusive cross-border payment instruments built upon the principle of minimizing trade barriers and non-discriminatory access, it is being said at the BRICS Declaration (Kazan Declaration, 2024).

While Russia tries to create an ally of East, Latin American and African countries, at the same time, it tries to destabilize European countries. They use many tools which include misinformation, disinformation and pure propaganda. The Russians always play on contradictions, exploit our vulnerabilities, and inflate topics that cause debate (Tsybulska, 2024). They skillfully raise topics that make people quarrel with each other, although we see this in other countries, especially during elections. This technique works. They are also using the promotion of Russian culture as the soft power to influence abroad (Kirilova, 2020). 

Russia’s war in Ukraine and its actions in other countries prompt an analysis of the modern ideological doctrine largely created by Oleksandr Dugin. His work the Foundations of Geopolitics represents a harsh and cynical repudiation of the architecture of international relations that was laboriously erected following the carnage of the Second World War and the emergence of nuclear weapons. He was convinced that Ukrainian sovereignty is such a negative phenomenon for Russian geopolitics that, in principle, it could easily provoke an armed conflict. According to Dugin, Ukraine as an independent state with some kind of territorial ambitions poses a huge threat to the whole of Eurasia, and without solving the Ukrainian problem at all it makes no sense to talk about continental geopolitics (Dugin, 2000). Even more, Dugin considered that Ukraine as a state has no geopolitical sense. It has no special cultural heritage, no geographical uniqueness, and no ethnic exclusiveness. His position denies Ukraine as a state and the Ukrainians as an independent nation.

José Casanova, a professor emeritus of sociology at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, considers that the world must create an equitable security system that is ‘not manipulated by the superpowers’.

‘[We have to] understand that Ukraine today is the sacrificial lamb for all the unwillingness of the West to act united in defense of its own norms and values, in defense of the world security system that they tried to establish,’ Casanova says (Treisman, 2024).

Another research Eric Ciaramella, a senior fellow of the Carnegie Endowment, has propose five elements that are critical to a future security arrangement:

  • strong political and legal codification that ensures the arrangement will endure regardless of electoral cycles and leadership changes in the United States and Europe;
  • a predictable, multiyear pipeline for military supplies that enables Ukraine to plan and sustain a future force structure capable of deterring Russian aggression;
  • support for Ukraine’s defense industry, as well as targeted defense industrial investments in the United States and Europe to prepare for a long war and an extended period of Ukrainian military reconstitution;
  • mechanisms for political consultations, information sharing, and coordination to ensure that Ukraine’s military needs are met in a timely fashion;
  • clear linkage to Ukraine’s EU accession process and postwar reconstruction (Ciaramella, 2024).

Obviously, the global security system needs to be improved, as wars such as the one in Ukraine are still possible. The system of checks and balances must be effective to prevent influential states from using their power to aggress and seize neighbouring territories.

On the one hand, Russia is under Western sanctions and seems to be formally isolated, while on the other hand, it is taking steps towards rapprochement with countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, creating alliances that may have more than just economic grounds in the future.

Conclusions

After launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin spoke of preventive actions, ‘demilitarisation’ and ‘denazification’, which did not correspond to the real situation. His actions actually meant seizing the capital and replacing the current government with a pro-Russian one. Obviously, to stop the processes of Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Only the resistance of the military and self-defense forces prevented Putin’s ‘Kyiv in three days’ plan from being implemented. 

Even now, after more than 2 years of war, Russia’s leader describes the biggest invasion in Europe since the end of the Second World War as a ‘special military operation’. Not the full-scale war that has bombed civilians across Ukraine and left more than millions either as refugees abroad or displaced inside their own country.

Four months into Russia’s 2022 invasion, the EU granted Ukraine candidate status and Kyiv is pushing to be accepted as soon as it can. Ukraine’s integration into the EU is not just a national aspiration, but a critical step for the strategic interests of the Union. NATO member states have increasingly sent Ukraine the air defense systems to protect its cities, as well as missile systems, artillery and drones that helped turn the tide against Russia’s invasion. Russia’s long-time leader was also desperate to prevent Ukraine from entering NATO’s orbit, but his attempt to blame the Western defensive alliance for the war is false.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has claimed negotiations with Russia are impossible until all Russian soldiers have been expelled from Ukrainian territory, and is seeking further Western assistance to defend his country. Putin’s statements about peace are reduced to the formula ‘if Kyiv is ready for it’. However, based on the materials published in the media, we can conclude that the conditions for a just peace are not in question.

Moreover, expansionism was the main geopolitical code of Russia/Soviet Union. We should rather conclude that Russia has expanded when the geopolitical situation on the frontiers has allowed. Politically Russia sought security by balancing power between its major rivals and trying to make neighboring countries’ behavior serve the purposes of Russian security. In fact, Russia has financial and people resources for creating the point of tension in the neighboring countries. Especially Poland, the Baltic countries, and the Balkan region, where Russia historically tried to push their interests. Russia’s intentions are not just territorial expansion; it seeks to inflict strategic damage on Ukraine and to establish a new world order that would favor its dominance. For Russia, this war is not just about territorial gains. It is also a struggle for global influence. Putin is trying to rewrite the geopolitical landscape and establish Russia as a superior superpower. If he achieves victory, or thinks he has, it would pave the way for further invasions.

Therefore, the Ukrainians are fighting not only to protect themselves but also the peace and calmness of neighboring countries. The real war is going on in Ukraine but other countries are being affected by the hybrid war of Russia, whose aim is to destabilise the situation, undermine trust in state institutions and strengthen Russian influence.

The war in Ukraine has entered the phase of attrition and has crossed regional borders. It is an embodiment of Putin’s wider ambitions to rebuild the Russian empire, and the means are violent. That is why the leaders of Western democracies should understand that Ukraine’s fate is linked to the future security of Europe, and this intellectual awareness must be accompanied by more decisive steps to ensure Ukraine’s success.

References

  1. Aljazeera (2024, August 12) Mirovalev M. In Ukraine, Peace Talks No Longer Taboo As Russia’s War Rages On.  Retrieved August 19, 2024 from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/8/12/in-ukraine-peace-talks-no-longer-taboo-as-russias-war-rages-on
  2. BBC (2023, December 14) Wright G., Shevchenko V. and Kirby P. Russia – Ukraine War: Putin Tells Russia His War Objectives Are Unchanged. Retrieved August 8, 2024 from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-67711802
  3. BBC (2023, February 24) Kirby P. Has Putin’s War Failed and What Does Russia Want From Ukraine? Retrieved August 8, 2024 from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589
  4. BBC (2024, October 22) Rosenberg S. Putin Gathers Allies to Show West’s Pressure Isn’t Working. Retrieved October 28, 2024 from https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cly3ylwg4eqo
  5. BBC (2024, October 16) Зеленський представив українцям свій план перемоги. У ньому 5 пунктів і секретні додатки [Zelensky presented his victory plan to Ukrainians. It has 5 points and secret annexes] Retrieved October 28, 2024 from План перемоги Зеленського: які у ньому пункти – BBC News Україна
  6. BRICS- Russia (2024) Kazan Declaration. Retrieved October 28, 2024 from https://cdn.brics-russia2024.ru/upload/docs/Kazan_Declaration_FINAL.pdf?1729693488349783
  7. Carnegie Endowment (2024) Ciaramella E. Envisioning a Long-Term Security Arrangement for Ukraine.  Retrieved November 8, 2024 from Envisioning a Long-Term Security Arrangement for Ukraine – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  8. Council on Foreign Relations (2023, November 21) McBride J. Russia’s Influence in the Balkans.  Retrieved August 29, 2024 from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/russias-influence-balkans
  9. Council on Foreign Relations (2024, May 16) Graham T. What Does Putin Really Want in Ukraine?  Retrieved August 8, 2024 from https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/what-does-putin-really-want-ukraine
  10. Current Time (Настоящее время, 2024, November 4) Surnacheva E. Какие у Путина “цели СВО”: документ от 2022 года раскрывает планы России на послевоенное устройство Украины [What Putin’s ‘SWO Goals’ Are: a 2022 Document Reveals Russia’s
  11. Plans for Ukraine’s Post-War Structure] Retrieved November 8, 2024 from https://search.app/Sy6xoeZL7hurLVL39
  12. Dugin A. Foundations of Geopolitics, Original version from Russian, Moscow, Arktogeia, 2000, 858 p.  – pp. 131- 132
  13. Euronews (2024, July 25). Russia Is ‘Open to Negotiation With Ukraine’, Moscow Claims. Retrieved August 22, 2024 from https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/07/25/russia-is-open-to-negotiations-with-ukraine-says-kremlin
  14. Fetoshi A. The Message That ‘Burns’(Octopus Institute, 2024) Retrieved November 8, 2024 from https://octopusinstitute.org/the-message-that-burns/
  15. George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (2019, April)  Galleotti M. The Baltic States as Targets and Levers: the Role of the Region in Russian Strategy. Retrieved August 28, 2024 from https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-insights/baltic-states-targets-and-levers-role-region-russian-strategy-0
  16. International Center for Defence and Security. Estonia (2020, December 21). Kirillova K. Soft Power and “Positive Propaganda”: How Russia Uses Cultural and Historical Stereotypes to Increase Political Influence. Retrieved October 28, 2024 from https://icds.ee/en/soft-power-and-positive-propaganda-how-russia-uses-cultural-and-historical-stereotypes-to-increase-political-influence/
  17. ISW (2024, June 14) Why Putin Remains Uninterested in Meaningful Negotiations in Ukraine. Retrieved August 22, 2024 from https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/why-putin-remains-uninterested-meaningful-negotiations-ukraine
  18. Komsomolskaya pravda (2022, February 24) Адамович О. Путин начал военную операцию в Донбассе. Полный текст обращения президента 24 февраля 2022 года. [Adamovich O. Putin Started a Military Operation in Donbass. The Full Text of the President’s Address] Retrieved August 2, 2024 from https://www.kp.ru/daily/27368/4550170/
  19. LRT (2023, May 1) Secret Kremlin Document Reveals Russia’s Plans for Baltic States – LRT investigation. Retrieved August 28, 2024 from https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1973471/secret-kremlin-document-reveals-russia-s-plans-for-baltic-states-lrt-investigation
  20. NATO (2023, December 14) Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg with the Prime Minister of Slovakia, Robert Fico. Retrieved October 14, 2024 from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_221473.htm
  21. NPR (2022, March 1) Treisman R. Putin’s Claim of Fighting Against Ukraine ‘Neo-Nazis’ Distorts History, Scholars Say. Retrieved August 8, 2024 from https://www.npr.org/2022/03/01/1083677765/putin-denazify-ukraine-russia-history

Ukrainian journalist Iryna Synelnyk has worked for the UNIAN information agency since 2005. She is a participant in the Residence in Kosovo program and currently works as a journalist for Ukrainian media. She covers political and social issues and topics related to the Russian war and occupation of Ukraine.

Iryna holds a PhD in History from the Institute of History of Ukraine and a Master of Public Administration from the National Academy of Management at the President of Ukraine. Her educational background is complemented by various professional internships in countries such as Estonia, the UK, Germany, and Poland, where she honed her skills in digital journalism and public policy.

Share.

Related Posts