Policy paper
Prof. Asoc. Dr. Arben Fetoshi
Director at the Institute for Studies of Hybrid Warfare OCTOPUS
arben.fetoshi@octopusinstitute.org
Acknowledgments:
I would like to sincerely thank all my colleagues for their unwavering support during the completion of this research, with special appreciation to Gurakuç Kuçi, Senior Researcher, and Lekë Beqa, Collaborator at the Institute, for their invaluable contributions.
Abstract:
Foreign interference in elections poses a serious threat to democracy and national security through disinformation campaigns, cyber-attacks, and covert financial operations. By examining manipulation methods and their destabilizing effects from cases of Russian interference in Moldova, Georgia, and Romania, this paper is able to draw parallels to Serbia’s systematic interference, which, through the Serbian List as a proxy organization, undermines Kosovo’s democracy and security. Given the ongoing hybrid attacks and similar tendencies to incite ethnic divisions in Kosovo ahead of the parliamentary elections on February 9, this paper also recommends a series of measures to neutralize foreign influence and strengthen resilience against Serbian interference.
Keywords: Foreign interference, Elections, Democracy, Security, Serbian List, Kosovo
Introduction
Elections play one of the most critical roles in sustaining the principles of democracy. To test its criticality—defined by Abraham Lincoln as “government of the people, by the people, for the people”—democratic societies have institutionalized the right of all citizens to vote freely and rationally elect their political representatives. However, this fundamental principle has often been undermined by foreign interferences with the purpose of serving specific geopolitical objectives. Through disinformation campaigns, cyber-attacks, and covert financial contributions, these interventions have sought to erode public trust in institutions, deepen polarization, and destabilize national security.
As a newly established state that declared independence in 2008 and hosts important international agencies (including NATO’s KFOR mission and the European Union’s EULEX mission), the Republic of Kosovo continues to face persistent and aggressive interference from Serbia across political, economic, and security domains. Serbia’s hybrid activities against Kosovo have generated ongoing tensions, obstructing the consolidation of democracy.
Election interference—whether in local or parliamentary elections—has always been viewed by Serbia as an opportunity for subversion. Due to constitutional provisions that grant minority communities, particularly the Serbian minority, “double voting” right and 10 reserved seats in the parliament. The Assembly of Kosovo cannot amend its constitution or pass crucial laws without securing a two-thirds majority that includes Serbian deputies. For this reason, Serbia has consistently interfered in the political organization of Kosovo’s Serbs, ensuring that only its controlled representatives assume leadership roles. After the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) led by Aleksandar Vučić took power in 2012, the Serbian List (Lista Serbe) was established in 2013. Through direct influence from Belgrade, this entity has monopolized the political representation of Kosovo Serbs.
The terrorist attack in Banjska, Zvečan, led by the vice-president of Lista Serbe, Milan Radoičić—who subsequently resigned but remains free in Serbia—demonstrates that Lista Serbe is not merely a political entity but an umbrella structure encompassing all hybrid activities against Kosovo.
Thus, given Serbia’s history of election interference, its increasingly hostile discourse following the dismantling of parallel structures, and the severe consequences of Russian meddling in Moldova, Georgia, and Romania in 2024, this article aims to address the challenges and threats Kosovo’s electoral process faces ahead of the parliamentary elections on February 9. It proposes a preventive framework that includes:
- Raising public awareness about the necessity of verifying media content to mitigate disinformation;
- Enhancing institutional vigilance against foreign interference mechanisms, including disinformation campaigns, deceptive narratives, covert financial contributions, cyber-attacks, and other forms of electoral subversion.
Since the integrity of the electoral process is vital to democracy, learning from external experiences and implementing adequate resilience measures is of paramount importance for Kosovo’s parliamentary elections on February 9th. Serbia’s public statements and actions suggest that its interference will be even more aggressive this time around. By exclusively supporting Lista Serbe and effectively “buying” the votes of Kosovo Serbs—through a decision to allocate €170 in social assistance to 5,000 Serbian citizens starting from February 1st—Serbia continues to suppress democratic expression within the Serbian community in Kosovo and exacerbate ethnic divisions. This sustained interference constitutes an ongoing national security threat. Kosovo will not be able to achieve genuine normalization with Serbia as long as Lista Serbe remains the dominant political entity representing Kosovo Serbs.
Foreign Interference in Elections
The never ending geopolitical competition among states at regional and international levels, driven by economic interests and expansionist ambitions, is the primary cause of malign foreign interferences. In 2024, Russia achieved alarming success in manipulating public opinion and distorting electoral outcomes in Georgia, Moldova, and Romania, underscoring the severe and pressing threat posed by foreign interference.
2.1. A Brief Historical Overview
The first time a debate took place over foreign interference is that of the U.S. elections which dates back to the campaign of the first American president, George Washington, during the war between France and Great Britain. The Federalists, led by Vice President John Adams, advocated for a neutral stance and stronger ties with Britain, whereas the Democratic-Republicans, led by Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, favored closer relations with France. When the Federalists secured the Jay Treaty (1794) with Britain, the French ambassador to the United States, Pierre-Auguste Adet, attempted to bribe senators to block its ratification but failed due to a lack of funds. He then changed tactics, publishing the treaty in American newspapers, successfully swaying public opinion against it. His interference in the 1796 presidential election between Adams and Jefferson also included the release of letters warning that Adams’ victory would lead to war with France, making these the first contested elections in U.S. history (Election Interference Overview).
Advancements in technology during the 20th century made foreign interference more sophisticated and complex. A prominent example is World War II when both Britain and Germany sought to influence U.S. policy—Britain aimed to encourage American intervention, while Germany sought to discourage it. Both nations used propaganda, disinformation, and intelligence-gathering to support their preferred candidates. Whereas, during the Cold War election interference took the form of both overt and covert campaigns.
Among covert interventions, the 2016 U.S. presidential election highlighted the growing threat of technology in shaping, manipulating, and polarizing public audiences. Russia’s interference in this election involved not only spreading fake news on Facebook, Twitter, and other platforms but also deploying fake social media accounts, automated bot profiles, online troll farms, and cyber-attacks. Congressional investigations revealed that a troll farm known as the Internet Research Agency (IRA), was run by Russian intelligence operatives.
In October 2019, the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee released the second volume of its report on Russian election interference (Report on The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election), which indicated that the IRA had also attempted to influence the 2020 presidential election. Shortly after the report’s release, Facebook announced that it had suspended three troll farm networks operating from Iran and another linked to the IRA, all of which sought to influence U.S. users. This IRA-linked network had managed to create 50 Instagram accounts and one Facebook page, amassing a total of 246,000 followers—60% of whom were U.S.-based.
Efforts to interfere in the 2020 U.S. elections were also documented in the National Intelligence Council’s report (Foreign Threats to the 2020 U.S. Federal Elections), which found that Russia attempted to undermine Joe Biden’s campaign, while Iran sought to damage Donald Trump’s re-election bid using similar tactics. Following the report’s publication, the Biden administration imposed sanctions on Russian and Iranian individuals and entities involved in election interference.
2.2. Case Studies
In 2024, Russia continued its hybrid warfare strategy by undermining democratic processes in neighboring regions. The tactics employed— which Serbia mirrors— revolve around three primary objectives: political destabilization, deepening social divisions, and mobilizing minority groups. In every targeted country, the dominant narrative aims to depict NATO and pro-Western governments as existential threats. The mechanism for disinformation campaigns integrates both traditional media and digital platforms. While state-controlled media amplify both ‘pro and contra’ messages to create confusion, online platforms such as Facebook, Telegram, and TikTok serve as arenas for disseminating disinformation.
Furthermore, elaborate cyber operations target electoral infrastructure with the aim of causing confusion, manipulating voters, and eroding public trust. This article examines two case studies of Russian interference: the 2024 Romanian presidential elections and the 2024 Georgian parliamentary elections.
a) The Case of Romania
In Romania’s presidential elections held on November 24, 2024, the ultra-nationalist pro-Russian candidate Călin Georgescu led the first round with 22.94% of the vote. This outcome defied pre-election polls, which had projected his support between 5-10%. Georgescu, a vocal critic of NATO and the EU, outperformed incumbent Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu, who secured only 19.5%, marking the first time in post-communist Romania that a Social Democrat (PSD) failed to reach the second round. Georgescu’s campaign was marked by a suspicious surge in social media activity, particularly on TikTok and Telegram, fueled by paid influencers and a coordinated network of accounts. Romanian intelligence services discovered that actors linked to Russia played a crucial role in amplifying pro-Russian and anti-Western narratives. TikTok removed millions of fake accounts promoting Georgescu’s messages, though the campaign had already inflicted significant damage. Intelligence assessments confirmed that many of these accounts were connected to Russian-affiliated entities, proving Moscow’s direct involvement in manipulating public opinion.
On December 6th, Romania’s Constitutional Court took an unprecedented step by annulling the election results due to widespread irregularities and credible suspicions of foreign interference.
b) The Case of Georgia
Georgia held its parliamentary elections on October 26, 2024. The ruling party, Georgian Dream, led by Bidzina Ivanishvili, won approximately 54% of the vote, consolidating Russian influence, while pro-Western opposition parties garnered only 38%. The electoral process was marred by allegations of fraud, including ballot stuffing, vote-buying, voter intimidation, and violence (Politico.eu).
Civil society organizations and opposition groups accused Georgian Dream of manipulating the election results by threatening public sector employees with dismissal unless they voted for the ruling party. The OSCE classified the elections as occurring in a “climate of widespread pressure”, reporting incidents of violence at polling stations, intimidation of journalists, and violations of voter privacy.
The ruling party’s control over the Central Election Commission (CEC) severely undermined transparency during the vote-counting process. Meanwhile, its campaign rhetoric framed opposition parties as “agents of foreign powers seeking to destabilize the country.” Kremlin-affiliated propaganda outlets portrayed Georgian Dream as a stabilizing force against external threats, reinforcing the narrative of Russian geopolitical dominance in Georgia’s political landscape.
2.3. Forms of Foreign Election Interference
Foreign election interference refers to efforts by a state to influence the electoral outcome of another country by supporting a preferred party or candidate while deliberately undermining the chances of their opponents. One key aspect—often overlooked, according to Palmer and Wilner (J. Marshall Palmer & Alex Wilner, 2024)—is that such interference does not occur without the consent of at least one participating party. They argue that domestic actors serve as essential intermediaries, capable of politically exploiting and leveraging foreign resources.
Interference manifests in various forms depending on the objectives and available tools, while its effects vary based on the intervention’s scale and the resilience of the targeted state. The primary forms of foreign election interference include:
- Disinformation – Utilizing media and online platforms to spread propaganda, false narratives, and fake news aimed at shaping public opinion, deepening social polarization, and undermining democratic processes.
- Cyber Attacks – Hacking the communications of political entities, compromising election management systems, and breaching voter databases to jeopardize electoral integrity and erode trust in the results.
- Financial Manipulation – Directly or covertly supporting media outlets and political parties that serve foreign interests to either favor or discredit specific candidates or parties.
- Hybrid Influence Operations – Combining multiple tactics, including the use of proxy groups to incite ethnic and religious divisions, as well as recruiting influencers and local activists to sway election outcomes.
- Covert Operations – Infiltrating campaign teams, political parties, and election commissions, or financing protests, strikes, and artificial crises to create political instability during election periods.
In an increasingly competitive international climate, where strategic rivalries are intensifying and information manipulation is becoming more sophisticated through Artificial Intelligence (AI), foreign election interference poses a growing threat to democracy and global security.
During the 2024 U.S. presidential election campaign, three adversarial actors—Russia, China, and Iran—demonstrated enhanced capabilities in generating and disseminating AI-driven disinformation. Examples include a deepfake video of President Biden urging voters in New Hampshire to abstain from voting, a fake audio clip of Vice President Kamala Harris speaking incoherently, and manipulated recordings of Donald Trump mocking Republican voters. These cases illustrate the weaponization of AI in electoral manipulation (Spitting Images: Tracking Deepfakes and Generative AI in Elections).
In early September 2024, the U.S. Department of Justice announced a series of measures to counter foreign interference in the upcoming presidential election, which were effectively implemented before and on election day. This strategy incorporated both governmental and non-governmental agencies building upon past election experiences. For example, during the 2016 election, Russian-hacked Hillary Clinton’s campaign emails were leaked, damaging her electoral prospects. In contrast, during the 2024 election, U.S. authorities refrained from publishing classified vetting documents concerning Vice Presidential candidate J.D. Vance.
Based on the success of this strategy, the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) published an analysis (The Future of Democracy, 2024), offering key recommendations for the European Union to counter future foreign election interference:
- Early Warning and Information Resilience: Prior to election day, U.S. authorities focused on enhancing transparency and public awareness regarding foreign manipulation tactics. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) issued regular security bulletins from 100 to 15 days before the elections. Exposing interference incidents—combined with strategic communication and public information sharing—proved to be an effective approach in the U.S. The EU should adopt a similar strategy, with the European External Action Service (EEAS) periodically publishing pre-election threat assessments.
- Enhanced Interagency Coordination: In 2022, the U.S. established the Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC), coordinating over 20 agencies to safeguard the presidential elections. In joint statements with the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), they exposed Russian efforts to amplify inauthentic content and debunked deepfake videos. Several EU member states are adopting similar measures, such as Sweden’s Psychological Defense Agency and France’s Viginum unit.
- The “Carrot and Stick” Approach: A cross-sectoral strategy enhances the detection of election-related threats, such as cyberattacks on electronic voting platforms and illicit financial contributions. This approach enables the prosecution and sanctioning of foreign actors while offering incentives for whistleblowers who provide intelligence leading to their identification. In the U.S., this strategy contributed to the indictment of three Iranian operatives affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
- AI Abuse Prevention Training: The FMIC has trained personnel to rapidly detect and assess the authenticity of deepfake materials. Addressing AI-enabled election manipulation requires increased government resources, expanded cooperation with social media and tech companies, regulatory measures to prevent harmful content amplification, and greater accountability within the private sector. Implementing such measures would strengthen efforts to neutralize AI-driven disinformation campaigns.
- Keeping Politics Out of fight: Before the 2024 elections, the U.S. developed a bipartisan plan to ensure the impartial dissemination of intelligence reports. A protocol, signed under the Biden administration, relies on assessments from a nonpartisan expert panel composed of intelligence analysts and civil servants. Their evaluations determine whether to issue public warnings about foreign interference. The EU should consider adopting a similar system to ensure that government alerts about foreign election meddling remain apolitical, while media across the political spectrum collectively engage in evidence-based public communication to foster a shared understanding of threats.
3. Implications of Serbia’s Interference in Kosovo
On February 9, 2025, Kosovo will hold its regular parliamentary elections. The Central Election Commission (CEC) has certified 28 political entities, six of which represent the Serbian minority. The Serbian List (Lista Serbe) continues to function as Belgrade’s proxy in its hybrid warfare against Kosovo. Based on developments in recent years, it remains the umbrella organization orchestrating all forms of electoral interference, particularly in political and security-related domains.
3.1. Political Implications
In the local elections of November 3, 2013, the Serbian List won 9 out of 10 Serb-majority municipalities, with the exception of Shtërpcë, where the Serbian Liberal Party (SLS) secured victory. Due to the poor electoral performance of its candidate in North Mitrovica, its members resorted to violently destroying ballot boxes. Only after a repeat election did it manage to win control of the municipality.
Moreover, the assassination of SLS candidate Dimitrije Janiqijević—who was running for mayor of North Mitrovica—on January 16, 2014, just two months after the elections, sent a clear message regarding the use of violence, intimidation, and blackmail against any political opponent of the Serbian List. Similarly, on January 16, 2018, in North Mitrovica, the prominent Serb politician Oliver Ivanović—a vocal critic of the Serbian List—was assassinated. Prior to his killing, Ivanović had publicly warned of threats from individuals associated with Aleksandar Vučić.
Through these intimidation tactics, the Serbian List successfully monopolized the Kosovo Serb vote in the 2017, 2019, and 2021 parliamentary elections. In the 2021 elections, beyond eliminating competitors from other Serb parties, it also attempted to create proxy parties from non-Serb minorities, including a Roma and a Bosniak party. These efforts to manipulate the elections sparked widespread condemnation from election monitoring organizations and QUINT countries in Kosovo.
Despite international criticism, the same pattern of interference is evident in the February 9, 2025, parliamentary elections. Aleksandar Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) has actively called on voters to support the Serbian List, while the Serbian government has mobilized all available resources to secure its victory (Radio Free Europe, January 22, 2025), including financial contributions as an instrument of influence. Through such actions, Serbia is not only interfering in Kosovo’s elections by distorting the political will of Kosovo Serbs but also actively undermining democracy, suppressing political pluralism, and denying Kosovo Serbs their right to freely choose their representatives.
Belgrade’s goal is not merely to secure all ten reserved parliamentary seats for Kosovo Serbs, but also to potentially gain additional mandates through proxy entities from other minority groups. This strategy serves a dual purpose:
- Blocking Kosovo’s Parliament from passing key legislation, particularly laws requiring a two-thirds majority, including minority representatives.
- Sending a political message of Serbian “unity” and “loyalty” to Belgrade’s proxy mechanism, reinforcing its hegemonic control over Kosovo Serbs—as emphasized in the Declaration adopted by the Pan-Serbian Assembly.
Such a scenario will not only further complicate EU-mediated normalization efforts between Kosovo and Serbia, but it will also prolong tensions, endanger regional stability, and pose a serious threat to peace and security in the Western Balkans.
3.2. Security Implications
In September 2023, the Republic of Kosovo faced its most severe armed attack by a terrorist group led by Milan Radoičić, the Vice President of the Serbian List. The failed incursion operation in the north—thwarted by Kosovo Police in Banjska, Zvečan—posed the gravest threat to national security and regional stability. The operation’s leadership confirms the Serbian List’s role as an “umbrella” entity for hybrid warfare, despite Radoičić’s resignation following his identification at the crime scene.
Due to his extensive influence, stemming from smuggling operations and other criminal activities, Radoičić has not only controlled the Serbian List but also dominated the entire northern region of Kosovo. Although he publicly claimed responsibility for the Banjska attack and has been indicted in Kosovo, he remains free in Serbia, reinforcing his ability to continue directing Serbian List operations. Media footage has shown him physically assaulting a Serbian official in North Mitrovica, while reports suggest he is currently hiding in Kopaonik. His continued presence and actions represent an ongoing security threat, as demonstrated by the terrorist attack on Kosovo’s critical infrastructure—the Ibër-Lepenc Canal—on November 29, 2024.
Beyond these physical attacks on Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, Serbia’s interference in national security extends to disinformation campaigns and deceptive narratives, particularly claims of “ethnic cleansing” against Kosovo Serbs. These tactics are designed to deepen ethnic and political polarization, fostering a climate of instability that could easily escalate into a broader conflict with destabilizing consequences not only for Kosovo, but the whole region.
4. Policy Recommendations
Given Russia’s imperial ambitions, which have led to its military aggression against Ukraine and geopolitical confrontations with the West, as well as its covert interference in the 2024 elections in Romania, Georgia, and Moldova, Serbia—acting as a satellite of Russian interests in the Western Balkans—has intensified its interference in Kosovo more than ever before. Since the strategies, tools, and methods used in election interference remain largely the same, Kosovo must adopt a comprehensive resilience strategy based on U.S. best practices and recommendations from the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) to counter foreign interference in the February 9 elections and beyond.
Recognizing the critical importance of this issue, the Institute for Hybrid Warfare Studies “OCTOPUS” organized a roundtable discussion in Pristina with international representatives, experts, and journalists from Kosovo and the region to explore the most effective countermeasures against foreign election interference. Finnish Ambassador Matti Nissinen elaborated on Finland’s national security strategy, which emphasizes preparedness, inclusivity, and resilience, recommending that Kosovo adopt similar measures to enhance national security and accelerate Euro-Atlantic integration. Serbian journalist Radomir Dimić described Aleksandar Vučić’s regime as “fascist” and the Serbian List as a tool for suppressing democracy among Kosovo Serbs. Other key contributors included Oleksiy Koshel (Ukraine, Committee of Voters of Ukraine), Festim Rizanaj (Hybrid.info – Kosovo), Kreshnik Gashi (Kallxo.com – Kosovo) and Enver Buqaj (Cybercrime Expert, University “Ukshin Hoti” – Prizren). Based on these discussions and research conducted by the OCTOPUS Institute, the following policy recommendations have been formulated:
- Public Awareness Campaigns on Disinformation Identification and other misleading content shared in the media. Institutions should launch regular security briefings in coordination with fact-checking organizations to alert the public about misleading media content and disinformation tactics.
- Enhanced Monitoring of online platforms related to fake content shared on Facebook, Twitter and other sites, fake accounts, automated profiles (bots), troll farms and misuse of Artificial Intelligence. Investments for a coordination center according to the American model would strengthen the capacities for neutralizing the manipulation of online information.
- Strengthening Cybersecurity regarding data and election system security. Although Kosovo has a legal framework for cybersecurity, a National Cybersecurity Strategy, and a Cybersecurity Agency, its cyber resilience remains weak. Increased investment in technology and expertise is essential to enhance cyber defenses against election-related cyber threats.
- Increasing financial transparency regarding donations, contributions and expenses of political subjects. A coordinated institutional approach that increases capacities for regional and international tracking of financial transactions.
- Expanding International Cooperation on Security and Resilience. Deepening partnerships with NATO and the EU will fortify Kosovo’s security infrastructure and provide a framework for joint resilience initiatives against foreign interference.
By implementing these measures, Kosovo can mitigate external threats, protect its democratic institutions, and ensure the integrity of its electoral processes in the face of growing hybrid warfare tactics from Serbia and Russia.
5. Conclusion
Foreign interference in Kosovo’s elections poses a serious threat to its democracy and national security. The greatest risk stems from Serbia, which continues to undermine Kosovo through all available means, including the Serbian List (Lista Serbe) and hybrid activities modeled after Russian tactics. The ongoing political conflict, stemming from Serbia’s non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence, has created a conducive environment for persistent interference, particularly in electoral processes.
The Serbian List is not merely a political entity used against the Republic of Kosovo; rather, it functions as a legalized proxy “umbrella” for hybrid operations, systematically obstructing Kosovo’s international consolidation as a sovereign state. Through pressure, blackmail, and even politically motivated assassinations, Serbia has imposed a monopoly over the Serbian List, ensuring tight control over the Kosovo Serb community and using it as a tool for political manipulation.
This proxy mechanism not only undermines democracy and denies Kosovo Serbs the right to freely choose their representatives, but it also seriously impacts Kosovo by enabling a “legislative blockade” in its parliamentary processes. The same interference patterns are evident in the February 9, 2025, parliamentary elections, making it crucial to expose and neutralize these threats.
To safeguard the integrity of the electoral process, immediate measures should focus on:
- Enhancing public awareness regarding disinformation and media manipulation.
- Strengthening institutional vigilance on cybersecurity and tracking covert financial contributions.
Building on previous measures, such as banning Serbia’s elections and referendum in Kosovo, the Republic of Kosovo must urgently draft a Comprehensive Strategy Against Foreign Interference, ensuring a systematic and proactive response to Serbia’s ongoing hybrid threats.
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