Abstract:

Keywords: census, ethnic engineering, landlocked territory, Montenegro, Serbia, Djukanovic, hybrid war.

Introduction:

In the turbulent Western Balkans, where history is followed by incomparable challenges and the ambitions of different parties, a small entity, but with a unique and important location, with access to the Adriatic Sea, puts itself at the center of a great international geopolitical game.

A small territory, but with a long coastline of 293.5 kilometers, and a water space of 2540 square kilometers, is not just a geographical fragment, but an explosion of potential tensions and invisible chances for external influence. Montenegro has historically been part of a dynamic political and strategic landscape, always put in the focus of great powers for various purposes.

For such a territory, with a limited area of 13,812 square kilometers and a troubled history, it has been difficult not to be constantly the object of imperialist ambitions. Serbia, with its historical ambitions and unwillingness to accept the status quo, has shown constant appetites to control this part of the Balkans, which has historically been influenced by various factors, including Russia and Serbia exclusively.

Unfortunately, the history of Montenegro has been uncertain and often associated with the challenges of international politics. After the First World War, this small country faced a “democratic” annexation by the Serbian Kingdom at that time. This event is similar to that of 1989, when Serbia suppressed Kosovo’s autonomy through force against the Kosovo parliament.

After the departure of the king of Montenegro, Nicholas, Serbia managed to create the necessary conditions within few days in December 1918 to draft the rules, hold a referendum and an assembly where the Montenegrins, among other things, joined Serbia, and the assembly that would then be dissolved very quickly after completing its mission. (Pavlović, 2008) (Littlefield, 1922)

Meanwhile, further changes after World War II and the breakup of Yugoslavia would bring about a series of transformations, with Montenegro remaining a part of the second and then third Yugoslavia until 2006.

The special part of the history of Montenegro extends back to 2006, when after a decisive referendum, with the important participation of the Albanian community, independence was declared. This decisive moment marks an important turning point, opening a new chapter in the independent life of Montenegro on the international stage.

In this context, the influence of the Albanian participants in this decisive process cannot be neglected. They, with their national consciousness and commitment to freedom and independence, have increased the weight of the decision in favor of the independence of Montenegro. This shows that, despite the challenges and tensions, Albanian national and cultural factors have a decisive role in the reversal of fortunes in this region with a complicated history.

The research question of the paper is: What are the geopolitical interests of Serbia in relation to Montenegro and how do these elements affect their relations?

The hypothesis of the paper is: “Serbia’s geopolitical interests in Montenegro appear as part of a general strategy to maintain its influence in the Western Balkans and to manage the various developments in the region. These interests include influencing politics within Montenegro, how to deal with ethnic and power distribution issues, and military and economic interests”.

The dependent variable is: “Serbia’s influence on Montenegro”

The research method of this paper is based on the analysis of the actions of Serbia against Montenegro, the geopolitical analysis, election analysis, hybrid war analysis, the analysis of ethnic engineering and the analysis of the “landlocked” country.

Djukanovic and the Road to Independence: Foreign Policy and the Assassination attempt of Djukanovic in Montenegrin History

Montenegro’s rapprochement with the West began in the mid-1990s, right after the Dayton agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Dayton Agreement was reached in August 1995, when Milo Djukanovic together with Svetozvar Marovic visited the Pentagon in the USA in November 1995. (Morrison, 2018) It should be remembered that Djukanovic was close to Milosevic and a friend of Momir Bulatovic, the president of Montenegro at that time, Bulatovic was also a close friend of Milosevic.

Djukanovic, with the evolution of policies after the Cold War, had also started a process of withdrawing from the Yugoslav leadership. His visit together with Marovic during his stay at the Pentagon was the providing of the Port of Bari for logistical operations of international peacekeepers in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Morrison, 2018) This moment made Montenegro a factor acting independently from Serbia and as a cooperating constituent on the international scene. Djukanovic also managed to negotiate the limitation of NATO attacks on the territory of Montenegro during the NATO bombing of Serbian military targets in the FRY. (Morrison, 2018)

This connection of Djukanovic with the West made him their man and the guardian of Montenegro’s road to independence, NATO and EU integration. However, this journey was not without challenges until the assassination attempt on Djukanovic.

When Montenegro had declared its independence from Serbia, Aleksander Vucic can be seen in a video saying that: “The referendum will be recognized by force…. but we will work to organize another one in the next 10-20 years, where we will be united again in the common state by democratic means”. (Filipovic, 2024) This video reveals that Serbia has never changed its approach of conquering its neighbors, even when it cooperated with the European Union, and that its strategy is completely built on the interests of Russia.

To prove that Vucic did not talk in vain about a strategic return of Russia and its proxy Serbia to Montenegro, we have the demands of Russia a few years later to take possession and access for military purposes to the Adriatic Sea via Montenegro.

In 2013, Montenegro had rejected a request by the Russian Federation to install a military base in its Adriatic port of Bar to provide logistical support to the Russian naval fleet in the Mediterranean. (MediTelegraph, 2013) A similar request to Montenegro was repeated in 2015, where in exchange for this permission, Montenegro would receive several billion dollars. (Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2015)

Ambassador Shaban Murati, at that time, considered that: “Russia, with its request, undertakes a geopolitical and military challenge to NATO, an attempt to change the balance of power in the Adriatic Sea, because all countries, including Montenegro, belong to the Euro-Atlantic strategic orientation and the Atlantic security spectrum”. (Murati, 2014)

This rejection of Russia by Montenegro greatly influenced the hardening of relations between Montenegro, Russia and Serbia. Russia and Serbia, both countries that have had a close historical relationship, were disappointed by Montenegro’s decision not to accept the Russian military base on their territory. This situation raised tensions in the region and created a sensitive political atmosphere, especially since Montenegro was showing a strong pro-Western attitude and on the path of integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures. In this context, Montenegro’s decision to reject Russia’s request was interpreted as a clear signal for its future political and military orientation towards the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. This naturally deepens the differences and challenges in regional relations, bringing a new intervention in the security situation in the Western Balkans. This action of Montenegro was also in favor of its other neighbors such as Albania, Kosovo, Croatia, but also for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The challenges for Montenegro would increase even more when the process of this country’s membership in NATO intensified even more. Montenegro’s NATO membership process turned the country into a complicated scene, prompting it to undertake a vigorous effort to cleanse its institutions of various infiltrations and influences, including those of Russia. This process was a sign of Montenegro’s determination to respond to the call of the West for membership in NATO. This response of Montenegro, led by Djukanovic, would almost cost him his life.

The security institutions of Montenegro had received a warning from the Kosovo Intelligence Agency (KIA) that they had discovered that an assassination attempt was being prepared during the elections against Milo Djukanovic. From this information, the Montenegrin security authorities managed to disrupt the plot and a group of 20 Serbian and Montenegrin citizens were arrested there, including the former head of the Serbian gendarmerie Bratislav Dikic and two Russian citizens. (Tomovic, 2018) In early November 2016, the Montenegrin prosecutor for organized crime and corruption who investigated the plot, Milivoje Katnic, concluded that a group of Russian nationalists had planned the assassination of Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic with the aim for an opposition party to come to power. (Gotev, 2016)

The Montenegrinpro-Serbian and pro-Russian opposition considered this assassination as a manipulation by Djukanovic to win another pair of elections. (Tomovic, 2018) Evidence in the court showed the opposite and before the “Supreme Court in Podgorica, the cooperating witness Sasha Singjelic stated that he refused the task given to him by the Russian citizen Eduard Shimakov to kill the Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic, during the elections of the year 2016”. (The Putsch Trial in Podgorica: The Russians Told Me to Kill Djukanovic, 2018)

When in 2022, the new and short-term Prime Minister Dritan Abazovic signed an agreement with the Serbian Orthodox Church, Djukanovic declared that the Serbian and Russian Churches are in the hands of Putin, who aims to destabilize the Western Balkans from 2016. (Metro, 2022) So, since the time of the assassination attempt of him [Djukanovic].

Russian influence in Montenegro is also confirmed by Macedonian intelligence documents released by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) and partners NOVA TV and the Crime and Corruption Reporting Network (KRIK). According to these documents, Ivan Stoilkovic, a pro-Russian Macedonian MP who was the leader of a small party in a coalition with VMRO and the Democratic Party of Serbs in Macedonia had met politicians and activists from Montenegro who were against the country’s NATO membership. (Dojčinović, 2017) According to the same documents, all of these were led by Goran Zivalovic, a BIA operative and official at the Serbian embassy in Skopje.

However, these challenges did not stop Montenegro from following the path of membership towards NATO, where it also achieved this on June 5, 2017, when Donald Trump had become the president of the USA only a few months earlier. He had not opposed Montenegro’s membership in NATO, but had called it a very aggressive country that could lead to the third world war. (The Guardian, 2018)

Until 2020, Montenegro would continue its safe journey towards western structures, but the situation started to change in 2020.

Political Change and Analysis of the Elections: Abazovic’s Agreement with the Serbian Church and the Consequences in the Political Scene

The 2020 parliamentary elections in Montenegro marked a dramatic turn in the course of events, adding to the challenges of maintaining a Western perspective. After three decades of rule by the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), a “pro-European” opposition coalition emerged triumphant, marking the end of a long dominance of a single party, the DPS.

The winners, the “For the Future of Montenegro” coalition, led by Zdravko Krivokapic, announced a new political era by securing 36 of the 81 seats in the Montenegrin parliament. This union of political forces from the right and left spectrum included: Democratic Montenegro (DCG), United Montenegro (UCG) and Civic Movement (CG), collecting 41 votes, enough for the creation of the government.

The ruling party, DPS, suffered a heavy defeat winning only 30 seats in the assembly. The new coalition to govern Montenegro elected Zdravko Krivokapic as prime minister, a leader who would remain in power for a period of just 14 months until early February 2022.

For the first time in the history of Montenegro, in August 2021, Dritan Abazovic, a figure of Albanian descent, who was supported by a coalition of pro-European and pro-Serbian forces, was elected prime minister. However, on this path to a new political direction, Abazovic displayed a sharp contrast between his entry into the political scene and his ouster from the office of prime minister. His rise and fall soon turned into a political drama after he signed a basic agreement with the Serbian Orthodox Church, opening up discussions and strong tensions in the Montenegrin political scene.

The agreement, first confirmed on Abazovic’s personal profile on the Telegram social network, a platform mentioned and accused of ties to Russia, “assigned extraterritorial rights to the Serbian Orthodox Church and many other benefits” (Kuka, 2022), causing a wave of opposition and downplaying the possibility of Montenegro’s stability. This event marks a critical point in recent developments, bringing new challenges and further reconfigurations in Montenegrin politics.

According to a research study of the daily “Pobjeda” during the government of Abazovic, changes were allowed in the border police, where the professional policemen were overlooked and replaced by incompetent but loyal policemen of the party. These actions, according to “Pobjeda”, had basically enabled Montenegro to have a non-functional border with the Republika Srpska, which together with Serbia are the main representatives of Russia in the Western Balkans. (Đuranović & Raičković, 2024)

However, the rationale for overthrowing the Abazovic government was found in the Agreement signed with the Serbian Orthodox Church, as this agreement had a profound impact on the internal political conflict in Montenegro, increasing tensions and unforeseen developments. Djukanovic, a staunch opp