Prof. Asoc. Dr. Arben Fetoshi
The most serious attack against Kosovo—the sabotage of the vital Ibër-Lepenc water supply infrastructure—is still being addressed through the same parameters of international political calculations, risking its interpretation as tacit “approval” for similar attacks in the future. The “cautious” reactions aimed at avoiding prejudgment of Serbia’s culpability, despite the clear context of hybrid warfare modeled on Russian tactics in northern Kosovo, threaten to enable the recurrence of such actions aimed at destabilizing the region.
Had the explosion in Zubin Potok completely destroyed the Ibër-Lepenc canal, it would have disrupted water supplies to regional water utilities in Mitrovica, Vushtrri, Drenas, and Prishtina, as well as to KEK’s (Kosovo Energy Corporation) thermal power plants, rendering them unable to produce electricity. This would have sparked panic and insecurity across most of the country. What independent criminal group could stand to gain from such destabilizing consequences if not for the political benefits in the fight against Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity? Beyond the findings of ongoing investigations, how critical is it to “sound the alarm” about Serbia, especially after evidence directly implicated it in the Banjska incursion (September 2023) and attacks against KFOR personnel?
Responsibility for the Attacks
Serbia’s swift denial of involvement in the terrorist attack on the Ibër-Lepenc canal is a defensive mechanism to avoid being blamed as the instigator by the international community, which had “tolerated” its actions following the Banjska incursion in Zveçan. In an effort to appear convincing, Vučić employed a counter-accusation strategy, framing the situation as a “harsh hybrid attack on Serbia,” while expressing a willingness to cooperate with Kosovo’s police (Kosovo Online, December 1, 2024). This is a tactical maneuver aimed at avoiding international rebuke, allowing Serbia to continue its aggression through the deceptive narrative of “Kosovo’s discrimination against Serbs in the north,” as evidenced by his statement following a meeting with the EU envoy, Miroslav Lajčák (Kosovo Online, December 3, 2024).
Given Serbia’s systematic and aggressive policies and its documented support for criminal groups operating as proxies for its expansionist goals, it would be naive to expect the investigations to uncover any written orders from Belgrade. However, the arsenal of weapons, explosives, grenades, military uniforms, and other equipment discovered during raids in various locations clearly points to politically motivated attacks. The Special Prosecution has already revealed that the Serbian brothers Dragisha and Jovan Viqentijeviq, who are under pretrial detention, are the main suspects in the attack, with investigations ongoing (Top Channel, December 5, 2024).
Regardless of the suspects’ affiliations, and beyond identifying the perpetrators—which remains crucial—diverting attention away from the Serbia-Russia axis of responsibility will hinder efforts to prevent future acts. The attack on the canal in Varragë followed grenade assaults on a police station and municipal offices in Zveçan, indicating coordinated activities aimed at:
- escalating tensions and insecurity in the north, and
- provoking destabilization throughout Kosovo to necessitate greater international focus and increase the likelihood of a “solution” aligned with Serbia’s ambitions.
By employing Russian methods in the regional context, terrorist attacks and sabotage—alongside other forms of hybrid warfare—are calculated activities designed to incite chaos. This chaos serves Putin’s interests in Ukraine and creates the preconditions for radical solutions detrimental to Kosovo before the start of the Trump administration in January 2025.
Tolerance as Encouragement
Despite warnings from the U.S. Intelligence Community (Annual Threat Assessment, February 5, 2024) about the risk of escalation this year, measures to discipline Serbia were absent following the terrorist attack in Banjska, Zveçan. According to international experts, this was a grave error that allowed Serbia’s terrorist policies to continue unchecked. Daniel Serwer asserts that these attacks are clearly incited, supported, and planned in Belgrade (rtklive.com, December 2, 2024).
Serbia’s involvement in the Banjska case was substantiated with direct evidence, such as documents related to a rocket-propelled grenade launcher seized after the attack, the training of terrorists by the Serbian military, and sophisticated weaponry and equipment originating from Serbia (Intelligence Briefing – Abnormal Normalisation: Kosovo-Serbia Tensions). Additionally, Bojan Mijailoviq, the bodyguard of the head of Serbia’s Intelligence Agency (BIA), was among the terrorists killed.
The Banjska attack was later claimed by Milan Radoičić, the former vice-chairman of the Serbian List and a close associate of Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić. Radoičić remains free in Serbia, a fact that British MP Alicia Kearns considers an encouragement for future terrorist attacks (rtklive.com, December 3, 2024). Former Serbian MP Dragan Šormaz declared at a conference organized by the Octopus Institute in Prishtina that Vučić cannot arrest the terrorists behind the Banjska attack because he is their leader (Former Serbian MP: The head of Banjska’s terrorists is Vučić).
Thus, a coordinated attack supported by Serbia, which prompted a NATO response by increasing KFOR forces, passed without Serbia being held accountable or sufficient pressure being applied to force the extradition of the aggressors to Kosovo. For this reason, Kosovo’s Special Prosecution has indicted Milan Radoičić and 44 others involved in the attack, though only three are in custody in Kosovo (Radio Free Europe, September 11, 2024).