Author: Dr. Iryna Synelnyk – External Collaborator of Institute
Abstract
Russian hybrid warfare has fundamentally adapted to the digital era, with the deployment of AI-enabled tools for large-scale, global disinformation campaigns. This paper focuses on the mechanisms and long-term risks associated with the pro-Russian “Pravda” network, an ecosystem of hundreds of automated news aggregators. This network strategically uses automation and translation capabilities to systematically flood the global information space with Kremlin narratives, thereby discrediting Western countries and justifying aggression in Ukraine. Particular attention is being paid to the fact that the network includes hundreds of sites, some of them targeting the Western Balkan countries. Pravda.Serbia, Pravda.Albania and Pravda.Balkans have not only disseminated pro-Russian messages, but also pro-Serbian ones, particularly those concerning Kosovo.
The paper concludes that the AI-driven scalability of Russian information warfare constitutes a critical threat to global information integrity and requires an urgent, coordinated policy response, focused on regulating AI training data and enhancing digital resilience across Europe.
Key words: hybrid warfare, the Pravda network, AI-tools, Serbia, Kosovo.
Introduction
Hybrid warfare which Russia has been waging against the Western countries for decades, uses various channels, tools, and actors. Moreover, Russia’s adaptability on the global stage is one of its most common characteristics of this process. The development of AI tools has enabled Russian propaganda to use this technology to create and distribute Kremlin narratives in countries around the world. The volume of information being disseminated and the number of countries where this is happening cannot but cause concern.
A bright example of Russian propaganda is the Pravda network that has been acting for the last few years worldwidely. This ecosystem, which means the truth in Russian, has been used either to spread disinformation and to train AI chatbots to provide this information in response to search queries. The Pravda network encompasses several hundred news aggregators, or portals, that repost content from Russian news sources, social media and Telegram channels. They appear to be fully automated and do not feature original content, but repost videos and translate publications in an effort to reach a wider audience and circumvent sanctions.
Since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, this country has been the main Russian target. And the Pravda network was also used for these goals. At the same time, propaganda has influenced other European countries, in particular the Balkans. Historically, Russia sees the Balkan that has a geopolitical location as its sphere of influence. Serbia has a pro-Russian position and copies the Russian strategy and tactic of hybrid warfare against the neighbours, primarily against Kosovo. Therefore, this topic is relevant because Russia is constantly improving its approaches to manipulating public opinion, expanding its tools and scope of influence.
The goal of this paper is to analyze the mechanisms and comprehensive impact of the Russian-led Pravda disinformation network, with a specific focus on its application of AI tools and its strategic projection of hybrid warfare tactics onto the Western Balkans. In this analysis we try to research how the Pravda network does in the Albanian and Serbian segments of the internet.
The research method of this study is based on a wide range of information sources and analytical techniques. The main focus of this method is on:
- Collection and analysis of information about the Pravda network, especially sites are connected to Kosovo’s issue;
- Geopolitical analysis of how Russia uses AI tools for content generation, translation, and automated dissemination of propaganda and disinformation, as well as for conducting hybrid warfare against the Western countries, Ukraine and the Western Balkans;
- Analysis of the prospects of combating hybrid threats via site networks.
The research methodology is based on a comprehensive analysis of using the AI-tools in hybrid warfare using the example of the Pravda network of websites. The approach consists of an in-depth study of literary sources, journalistic investigations, documents, analysis of scientific works, articles in the media, reports and case studies related to the hybrid war waged by Russia in European countries. The method of comparative analysis is used to compare information from media and think tanks. Using the methods of systematic and retrospective analysis, the article examines the peculiarities of the functioning of Russian propaganda in European countries, its influence on the security and stability in Europe and Western Balkan.
News aggregators for spreading the Kremlin’s narratives and train AI chatbots
Modern philosopher Yuval Noah Harari warned society that the widespread use of AI would usher in a new revolution and radically change the life of humanity. At the same time, he claims that AI could pose a threat to democracy under tyrannical regimes, for example from Russia.
According to Harari, Russia does offer an alternative model to liberal democracy but this model is not a coherent political ideology. Rather, it is a political practice in which a number of oligarchs monopolise most of a country’s wealth and power, and then use their control of the media to hide their activities and cement their rules. The government control of the media prevents citizens from realising the truth (Harari, 2018). Contemporary Russia tries to influence public opinion and political schedule not only within the country, but abroad as well.
Formally known as Portal Kombat, the Pravda network is an inauthentic network of hundreds of news aggregators that has spread pro-Kremlin content since 2014. The DFRLab previously found that the Pravda network had targeted more than eighty regions and countries globally and heavily relied on machine translation. In addition, we reported on a Russian Wikipedia knock-off, dubbed the ‘Encyclopedia Runiversalis’, which heavily promoted pro-Kremlin narratives targeting domestic Russian and global audiences (Châtelet, Lesplingart, March 2025).
Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine Russia has intensified the hybrid warfare activity and the website ecosystem Pravda expanded its infrastructure. The operation has evolved to encompass more countries and launder content in more languages across Europe, Africa, and Asia. Website forensic analysis linked the operation to the Crimea-based IT company TigerWeb, as well as its owner, who shares dubious links with the Russian-backed government of occupied Crimea (Châtelet, Lesplingart, February 2025). According to NewsGuard, over the three years of Russia’s invasion, Pravda has spread at least 207 disinformation narratives, including claims about ‘secret U.S. biolabs in Ukraine’ and accusations of ‘Zelensky’s misuse of U.S. military aid’ etc. (Sadeghi, Blachez, 2025).
As reported by the French disinformation watchdog Viginum, in the leadup to the 2024 European parliamentary elections, the Pravda ecosystem evolved and launched new domains targeting almost every member country of the European Union, as well as countries of the European Eastern Partnership (Viginum, 2024). Between December 3, 2024 and January 8, 2025, twenty-eight new subdomains appeared, targeting a wide array of countries in Europe, including Malta, Iceland, Ireland, the Balkans, Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, and Montenegro (Châtelet, Lesplingart, February 2025).
In February 2025, the American Sunlight Project published a report indicating that the content hosted on the news-Pravda website could potentially be AI-generated, further questioning the reliability and integrity of information disseminated by the Pravda network. This finding raises critical concerns about the integrity of information consumed by users and subsequently reinforced through generative AI tools. Large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT, Gemini, or Copilot are trained on extensive datasets to enhance their language comprehension and generation capabilities. A notable component of these datasets is Wikipedia, which provides a vast repository of human knowledge across diverse subjects (American Sunlight Project, 2025).
Even more, the ASP’s report underscores how these coordinated disinformation efforts are not only pervasive but increasingly sophisticated. The Pravda network is now producing at least 3 million articles of pro-Russian content annually, which is further amplified across platforms like X, Telegram, Bluesky, and VK (American Sunlight Project, 2025). These operations, which are centralized and automated, have spread harmful anti-democratic disinformation while often being laundered through more legitimate channels, further eroding trust in credible sources.
A well-funded Moscow-based global ‘news’ network infected Western artificial intelligence tools worldwide with Russian propaganda. This disinformation network is pursuing an ambitious strategy by deliberately infiltrating the retrieved data of artificial intelligence chatbots, publishing false claims and propaganda for the purpose of affecting the responses of AI models on topics in the news rather than by targeting human readers, NewsGuard has confirmed (Sadeghi, Blachez, 2025). By flooding search results and web crawlers with pro-Kremlin falsehoods, the network is distorting how large language models process and present news and information. The result: Massive amounts of Russian propaganda — 3,600,000 articles in 2024 — are now incorporated in the outputs of Western AI systems, infecting their responses with false claims and propaganda (France24, 2025). These figures conceal the network’s significant potential impact. Instead of growing its organic audience on social media, the network focused on saturating search results with automated content on a large scale.
The tactic of ‘LLM influence’ involves malicious intent to encourage generative AI or other software that relies on LLM to be more likely to reproduce a certain narrative or worldview. This strategy, in a likely attempt to evade global sanctions on Russian news outlets, is now poisoning AI tools and Wikipedia. By posing as authoritative sources on Wikipedia and reliable news outlets cited by popular large language models (LLMs), Russian tropes are rewriting the story of Russia’s war in Ukraine. The direct consequence is the exposure of Western audiences to content containing pro-Kremlin, anti-Ukrainian, and anti-Western messaging when using AI chatbots that rely on LLMs trained on material such as Wikipedia (Châtelet, 2025).
Researchers have made the conclusion that the Pravda network systematically has been publishing multiple articles in multiple languages from different sources to advance the same disinformation narrative. By creating a high volume of content that echoes the same false claims across seemingly independent websites, the network maximizes the likelihood that AI models will encounter and incorporate these narratives into web data used by chatbots.
The Russian network ‘Pravda’ in the Western Balkans and Kosovo
The Western Balkans are an important geopolitical location for the European Union due to their strategic position and influence on stability in Eastern Europe. This is the reason why this region is also targeted by Russia. Russian disinformation causes tension in the political, economic and social spheres, threatening the efforts of countries in the region to integrate with Europe. Russia resents the region’s push for integration with the EU and NATO, and seeks to use persistent ethnic and religious fault lines to undermine these efforts. The Balkans have long proved fertile ground for pro-Russian narratives, especially in Serbia. On the one hand, Serbia, Russia’s main partner, wants to be part of the EU, but on the other hand, it continues to support Russia, and didn’t join the European sanctions against Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Kurti, 2024). Kosovo as an independent country is a goal of Russian and Serbian propaganda.
The Center for Information, Democracy and Citizenship at the American University in Bulgaria analyzed more than 640,000 articles published on the websites of the Pravda network in 45 countries between December 2024 and March 2025. According to the Center, this is a network for spreading disinformation related to Russia. In terms of the number of published articles in relation to the population, Serbia ranked fourth among all countries included in the research, after Moldova, Latvia and Estonia (Support4Parthership, 2025).
The Balkan versions of Portal Kombat websites were strikingly similar across different languages. The bogus news websites targeting the region had the same layout, structure, and name. The first Pravda website, in Serbian – Pravda-rs.com – was registered on March 20. A few days later – and within seconds of each other – another three Pravda domains were registered: in Bosnian, Macedonian, and Albanian (Jevtovic, Katic, 2024). All Pravda websites use the same kind of sources, in particular: Russian State-owned or controlled media, such as TASS, RIA, Lenta, Tsargrad and so on; Telegram accounts in Russian, which are automatically translated into local languages; pro-Russian Telegram accounts that publish in local languages (usually content that has been automatically translated); reputable sources (on rare occasions) when they publish content that can be seen as favorable by Russia. It should also be noted that these pro-Russian Telegram channels also have a presence in other social media, especially X, formerly Twitter (Sitistas, Canetta, Panizio, 2024). It reveals a sophisticated propaganda and disinformation operation with clear links to the Kremlin. The network primarily functions through the automated distribution of content sourced from Russian state media and Telegram channels, which is then automatically translated into various Balkan languages.
In summer 2025, Kosovo’s hybrid researcher Festim Rizanaj published an analysis The Russian propaganda network Pravda in the Balkans. He mentioned that although the Balkans represent only 3.2% of the global population, they have been targeted with 16.2% of the Pravda network’s content—demonstrating that the region is treated as a distinct focus. From March 2024 to March 2025 there were disseminated more than 2600 articles (Rizanaj, 2025). The report specifically examines the activities of this network in the Balkan region, with a focus on Albanian-speaking areas.
According this report, the articles that push the pro-Russian and pro-Serbian narratives are highly critical of NATO, the European Union (EU), the United States (US), and Western policies – particularly those related to the Balkans and the independence of Kosovo, which is portrayed as a source of conflict and injustice. In contrast, Russia is depicted as an ally and a defender of traditional values and international law.
These articles were not produced by local actors, but were published by the Russian propaganda network Pravda itself. They are distributed through its Albanian-language platform ‘albania.news-pravda.com’ and constitute reprints of content coming from various Russian and Serbian sources, including Russia Today (RT), Sputnik News, TASS, RIA Novosti, the Telegram channels of the Russian Embassy in Albania, as well as other propaganda platforms linked to Russian and Serbian government (Rizanaj, 2025).
We have revealed some pages linking to Pravda, which contains articles that disseminate pro-Russian and pro-Serbian narratives. These materials give Russian and Serbian attitudes to world events, for example, discredit the Kosovo authorities, manipulate relations between the Balkan country and Europe, and openly promote Serbian interests. There are Pravda Serbia, Pravda Balkan, and Pravda Albania, but their content includes materials often based on statements by the Kremlin and Russian state media. They provide information in English, Albanian and Serbian respectively. Despite being exposed, they continue to operate, publishing a few news stories or a few dozens.
The news items published on the website include quotes from Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, and Milorad Dodik, the leader of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is even a link to the Telegram channel of Oleg Tsarev, a pro-Russian politician who fled Ukraine. Website Pravda Kosovo does not exist because Serbia denies this country as an independent state, compares it to Crimea and accuses it of ‘institutional terrorism’ against the Serbian community. In general, the search engines on websites return up to 6,000 links mentioning Kosovo as of the end of September 2025 when searching for the name of the country. Some of the news from the Pravda network which is linked to the Balkans, looks like this:
September 9, 2025 – The West does not like referendums — Lavrov (comparing Kosovo’s independent and so-called referendum in Crimea).
September 12, 2025 – US halts dialogue with Kosovo.
September 15, 2025 – Military tourism. Another show of force in ‘Kosovo’ the Croatian KFOR contingent, together with the Scottish Guard, conducted joint exercises in the ‘Kosovo’ community of Decani.
September 16, 2025 – Kosovo. Croatian troops, as part of the KFOR mission, together with the Scottish Guards, conducted joint exercises in the Decani community in Kosovo and Metohija.
September 16, 2025 – The Triple Alliance. Geopolitical blackmail Six months after the signing of the military cooperation pact, the authorities of Kosovo, Albania and Croatia began to implement it and began preparations for joint military.
September, 21, 2025 – Kosovo and Metohija.. @vestniksrb — the main thing about Serbia and the Balkans.
September 24, 2025 – Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov discussed the situation in Kosovo with his Serbian counterpart, Marko Djuric, as he reiterated the support for Serbia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
September 25, 2025 – Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov discussed the situation in Kosovo with his Serbian counterpart, Marko Djuric, as he reiterated the support for Serbia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
September 27, 2025 – Lavrov: Systematic attacks on the Serbian people are taking place in Kosovo and BiH.
September 30, 2025 – Supply and conquer. Eastern Guardianship for Pristina In Kosovo, local residents were pleased with a free ride on trailers of armored vehicles.
September 30, 2025 – Military vehicles were transported on trucks from Turkey to Prizren, Kosovo.
For the status of Kosovo the articles usually employ terms such as ‘Serbian province’, ‘separatist enclave’, and ‘occupied territory’. Rizanaj highlights four main themes concerning Kosovo and the Kosovar Albanians that are being promoted on the Pravda network.
- Discrimination against Serbs: They describe ‘institutional terrorism’, arbitrary arrests, and the displacement of Serbs, portraying Prishtina as the aggressor.
- Critiques of the Kosovo Government: Particularly targeted is Albin Kurti, who is portrayed as a provocateur and anti-Serb.
- Western double standards: It compares the treatment of Kosovo to that of Crimea and other regions to highlight what it portrays as the West’s double standards.
- Republika Srpska: Relations with Kosovo are framed as part of a ‘joint Serbian-Russian struggle’ against Western pressure (Rizanaj, 2025).
As noticed a prof. Arben Fetoshi, the ideological basis of Serbian propaganda is a mixture of mythology, historical falsification, and ethno-religious nationalism. Even today, Serbia continues the same strategy, now more sophisticated due to the opportunities offered by the digital revolution. Synchronization with the Russian strategy, by applying well-known techniques such as ‘emotional hijacking’, which aims to mobilize by arousing indignation among citizens, or ‘gaslighting’, which seeks to deceive at the international level through distortion of reality, serves as an instrument of ‘justification’, just as in the time of Milošević or Putin’s military interventions in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014) (Fetoshi, 2025).
Within the revisionist objectives of the so-called ‘Russian World’ and ‘Serbian World’, he interprets the establishment of the Russian Historical Society’s branch in Belgrade as the most challenging hybrid component for constructing a ‘manipulated memory’, aimed at mobilization against the democratic order, NATO as a security infrastructure, and the state of Kosovo as a project of regional stability and peace (Fetoshi, 2025). [A1]
Despite Rizanaj’s conclusion about the minimal and negligible impact of the Pravdanetwork on the Albanian-speaking audience—due to poor-quality automated translations, absence from the main social media platforms popular among Albanians, ineffective SEO strategies, and very low organic traffic (Rizanaj, 2025), the network’s other long-term goals of manipulating online ‘knowledge’ should not be underestimated. Numerous tests have shown that content from Pravda news portals has found its way into responses generated by artificial intelligence models such as ChatGPTand Gemini. Moreover, even when the responses included report sources that verified Pravda’s links to Russia, the chatbots failed to disclose this information explicitly.
The main goal of the Pravda network is to exert indirect influence through the constant repetition of Russian narratives in the Albanian-speaking digital space. The aim is also to influence artificial intelligence such as chatbots (Support4Parthership, June 2025).
Despite its seemingly minimal influence, the Pravda network continues to operate, spreading pro-Russian and pro-Serbian narratives. Of much greater concern is the volume of material that is disseminated non-stop, 24/7, flooding the internet with propaganda and training artificial intelligence models to deliver this information in response to user queries. It is currently unclear how this harmful network may be exploited in the future.
Conclusions
Russia has been expanding the range of tools it uses to influence foreign audiences. Starting with foreign broadcasting to present its vision of events to the world, Russia has been constantly refining its aggressive approaches and manipulative techniques.
- Strategic implication
For almost two years, there has been knowledge of the Pravda network, which disseminates Kremlin narratives in dozens of languages including such rare ones. Despite being exposed, the network’s websites continue to function, publishing news from Russian state media and propaganda channels. This network operates with support of artificial intelligence and systematically floods the internet with information reflecting Russia’s position, aimed at discrediting Western countries and justifying aggression in Ukraine.
2. Long-term impact
Experts have warned of serious long-term risks associated with attempts to manipulate artificial intelligence. The more false narratives circulate in online media, the greater the likelihood that language models will begin to treat them as credible and incorporate them into their responses. The network’s massive, multi-lingual duplication of false content effectively ‘trains’ AI language models to treat propaganda as credible information. And the main danger of this network is that, due to the significant amount of information duplicated in different languages, it trains AI.
The impact of this network on the global information space became apparent after researchers from DFRLab and CheckFirst noted that materials from Pravda portals began to be cited in Wikipedia in various languages. Several studies have found that AI models such as ChatGPT, Copilot, Perplexity, and Gemini unhesitatingly cited sites associated with the Pravda network.
3. Regional targeting
Pro-Russian and pro-Serbian narratives are being spread covertly and reinforced through popular technologies used by millions of people around the world. As a result, Kosovo as an independent country is targeted by Russian and Serbian propaganda. There are thousands of articles in the site’s connection to Balkans, Albania and Serbia, where Kosovo is mentioned with negative connotations, doubts about political and economic capacity, and criticism of the country’s political elite. It has a negative impact, because eventually, stability and peace in the Western Balkans are of strategic importance for the security of the entire European continent.
Russian disinformation campaigns can influence public opinion and distort the image of the EU. This can lead to mistrust of European institutions, undermine support for European integration efforts, and the aid for Ukraine. This disinformation campaign aimed at long-term impact to the global internet, distorting the public’s understanding of facts and ability to make well-informed decisions and choices in the future electoral campaign.
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