Author: Dr. Iryna Synelnyk
Abstract
The shaping of public opinion through the spread of fake news, disinformation and manipulation is becoming a threatening trend today, especially during the elections. This paper focuses on issues of manipulation tools through social media as an attempt to provide political influence and achieve an advantage in election campaigns. This topic is covered in cases of the presidential campaign in Moldova and Romania 2024, where we have evidence of Russia’s election interference as part of a hybrid warfare which it has been gaining against the Western world.
As a result, the scale of the spread of disinformation and fake news has reached alarming proportions. The study is based on an in-depth analysis of journalistic materials and investigations, analyses of leading think tanks reports and case studies related to the hybrid war waged by Russia in European countries. Particular attention is being paid to countering external interference in elections by joining forces to counter Russian propaganda and increase media literacy. It is conducted that external interference and manipulation, amplified by algorithms and AI capabilities, can create a distorted reality and pose a threat to democracy around the world.
Key words: elections campaign, social media, election interference, hybrid warfare
Introduction
Nowadays, social media has become an integral part of our lives, making it easier for everyone to create and share information. It is not only a virtual space for people of different generations and countries, but also an essential tool for shaping public opinion and influencing political, social and economic life. It was one of the most important tools to advance in the political struggle in the 2019 Ukraine presidential campaign, when the former comedian won the elections. For example, during the presidential and parliamentary campaigns in Ukraine, electoral technologies were used to engage young people (the social network Instagram), to contrast ‘new’ and ‘old’ politicians (the TV series ‘Servant of the People’), to intensify horizontal communications and online communities to attract V.Zelenskyy’s supporters (Svecla, 2024).
At the same time, social media is a huge platform for sharing propaganda, desinformation and fake news that poses real threats to democratic institutions and even states. In this context, social media is also very good at creating polarization, and even causing harmful psychological effects. A wide range of forms and methods of political communication on the Internet are aimed at a more dynamic influence on the consciousness, beliefs, and behaviour of the audience. Therefore, we should consider social media as an influential platform to reach target audiences especially in election campaigns.
First of all, we should clarify the definition of ‘social media’. We consider that social media is a computer-based technology that facilitates the sharing of ideas, thoughts, and information through virtual networks and communities (Dollarhide M., 2024). Today, the largest social media platforms worldwide are Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp, Instagram, TikTok. By the way, the active use of social media has marked a new era of information and communication discourse, where the quality and reliability of content is inferior to the efficiency of its delivery.
Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election produced the biggest political scandal in a generation, marking the beginning of an ongoing attack on democracy. In the run-up to the 2020 election, Russia was found to have engaged in more “information operations,” a practice that has been increasingly adopted by other countries. The 2024 elections in European countries demonstrated Russia’s proven attempts to interfere in the electoral processes. The relevance of the topic is that these attempts will continue in the future, given the current policy of the Russian Federation. Therefore, it is very important to analyse them in order to prevent unpredictable situations in the future. The problem is not even interference in specific elections, but in Russia’s long-term perspective.
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the peculiarities of the functioning of social networks in political struggle and hybrid warfare through Russian attempts to influence the presidential election campaigns in Moldova and Romania in 2024.
Hypothesis: Social media can have a destructive impact on the elections through manipulative influence, disinformation campaigns using fake accounts and troll factories, which undermines trust in democratic processes and institutions.
The research method of this study is based on a wide range of information sources and analytical techniques. The main focus of this method is on:
- Collection and analysis of the presidential election campaigns in Moldova and Romania in 2024 and Russia’s attempts to interfere in these elections.
- Geopolitical analysis of how Russia uses social media to spread propaganda and disinformation and to conduct hybrid warfare against the Western world.
- Analysis of the prospects of combating hybrid threats via social media.
The research methodology is based on a comprehensive analysis of various aspects of the use of social media in hybrid warfare. The approach consists of an in-depth study of literary sources, journalistic investigations, documents, analysis of scientific works, articles in Moldavian, Romanian and Western media, reports and case studies related to the hybrid war waged by Russia in European countries. The method of comparative analysis is used to compare information from media and think tanks. Using the methods of systematic and retrospective analysis, the article examines the peculiarities of the functioning of Russian propaganda in European countries, its influence on the course of election campaigns, and the security and stability in Europe.
Social media in hybrid warfare as tool of destabilization and disinformation
Russia’s attempts to interfere in elections are part of the hybrid warfare that the Russian Federation is waging against Western countries. Ukrainian expert Yevhen Magda considers that hybrid warfare is an attempt by one state to subjugate another using political, economic, and information tools. That is why, in a hybrid war, combat actions are secondary, and information operations and other levers of influence come to the fore. War is the desire of one state to aggressively influence the minds of the inhabitants of another. In other words, it is a desire not to destroy millions of people, but to intimidate and demoralise them (Magda, 2015). Thanks to the speed of information dissemination around the world, it has become not only a commodity but also a weapon.
Over time, the definition of ‘hybrid warfare’ has acquired a broader meaning. National Security Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War Mason Clark emphasizes that the Russian conception of hybrid war is much more expansive. It covers the entire ‘competition space’, including subversive, economic, information, and diplomatic means. Russia sees hybrid wars as the main line of future military development, rather than a temporary phenomenon (Clark, 2020). He wrote it in 2020, before the Russian full-scale invasion in Ukraine started, that the Russian military maintains theoretical space for the idea of a traditional conventional war and does not assert that all conflicts are now inherently hybrid. It instead argues that conventional war is a legacy type of conflict that is increasingly unlikely in the 21st century due to technological changes and strategic power balances. But these days in Ukraine we can see the mix of a military conflict with hybrid warfare.
In 2024, Mark Rutte, the NATO secretary general, warned that Russia’s ‘intensifying campaign of hybrid attacks’ highlights the way in which Moscow is quickly shifting the frontline from Ukraine to the Baltic region, to western Europe and even to the high north (Cecco, 2024). Such efforts to spread mayhem have taken many forms: even before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow was linked to broad disinformation campaigns during the 2016 US election and the Brexit referendum, meant to sow discord and confusion among the electorate through social media.
On the other hand, hybrid warfare takes place in the intermediate zone between war and peace. Influence operations target established media and journalists, or by exploiting new opportunities, they create ‘media’ and ‘journalists’ to disseminate specific messages and narratives. Alongside manipulative content created and spread by social bots and bot farms like the Internet Research Agency (IRA) based in Russia, or more recently using Artificial Intelligence for deep fakes, hybrid warfare also seeks media and journalists to camouflage deceptive content as public information (Fetoshi, 2024).
Traditionally, a bot farm is an organised group that creates and manages a network of bots or fake accounts on social media, email services and messengers. The bot farms are used to spread fake news, propagate certain narratives, manipulative information, as well as to commit fraud and cyberattacks (Shynshynov, 2023). The bot farms can be used to manipulate public opinion, influence electoral processes and the political situation in the country. This can lead to a distortion of the democratic process and undermine trust in political institutions.
Therefore, the election is the perfect time to share disinformation, misinformation and real fake news. The main purpose in that process is attempts to strengthen the influence of right-wing and far-right politicians, support those who openly hold pro-Russian positions, and, in general, create more chaos and panic, undermine confidence in state institutions in European countries and democracy in general. And social media is the best way to do that.
Russia’s attempts to influence the presidential election in Moldova and Romania
Comparing two presidential election campaigns in Moldova and Romania, it is clear that both of which experienced electoral interference, but the Moldovan authorities reacted in the right way and avoided cancelling the campaign or the result as it happened in Romania. The Moldovan authorities had been dealing with Russian hybrid warfare for decades, so they were more prepared for these threats. Because Moldova used to be part of the USSR, it has a large Russian-speaking population. Moldova also includes Transnistria, a quasi-state where the Russian military is now based. On the other hand, Russian interference, seemed unpredictable to the Romanian authorities.
In 2024, Moldova had historical elections because citizens not only elected the president, but decided via referendum if they should align with the EU in the future. Strongly pro-Western President Maia Sandu, who was seeking a second term, was targeted by Russia because Transnistria, an unrecognised part of Moldova, is under Russian influence and the Kremlin could share power with the whole country.
Moscow, unsurprisingly, assesses a Sandu reelection as antithetical to its interests. The Kremlin aimed to reverse trends that had seen Chișinău gradually weaken Russian influence. And while the two pivotal election issues were at the epicenter of Moscow’s malign operations, its targeting Moldova long precedes and will likely long follow the vote (Ntousas, Plesca, 2024).
Russian hybrid attacks against Moldova have sharply increased since at least spring 2022, when Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine again made its nefarious intentions in the region clear. A first warning of Russian aims and capabilities was its intervention in Moldova’s 2023 local elections. The country’s Information and Security Service reported that Moscow invested approximately $55 million to influence the vote, deploying illegal financing and disinformation tactics to sway the outcome, helping pro-Russian candidates win, and deeping political division in key cities such as Bălți and Orhei wich located in pro-Russian Gagauzia region (Volintiru, Plesca, 2023).
Russia has left no stone unturned in its interference efforts, launching attacks of extraordinary volume, scope, and diversity. A vital part of its repertoire has been relentless and sophisticated disinformation campaigns that intended to upend the country’s EU course and weaken the authority of, and trust in, pro-European and pro-Western political figures (Ntousas, Plesca, 2024). Sandu has been the object of many of these attacks, even serving as the main figure in several deepfake videos generated using artificial intelligence. Even diplomats had warned Russia before the presidential election in Moldova. They emphasized that Sandu’s opponents were agitating criticism of the incumbent Moldovan president’s government and political party, in order to incite protests. Part of these operations would include spreading lies about the incumbent president’s character and intentions, and about supposed electoral irregularities (U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Russia, 2024).
Russian malign influence groups have operated in Moldova for years, attempting to destabilize its democracy and ensure that Moldovan leadership remains more closely aligned with Russia than with the West. In the past, Russia’s methods have included training anti-government groups and encouraging them to engage in protests calling for pro-Western President Maia Sandu to resign (Benjamin, 2024). The Russian government is also believed responsible for a group of fake Facebook accounts created–and later removed from the platform–this year, targeted at building support for pro-Russia political parties among the Russian-speaking Moldovan population.
Overall, according to experts, the elections in Moldova were held in an environment of unprecedented interference, including manipulation of voter opinion, organised transportation of voters to polling stations, cyberattacks and bribery. The Moldovan government estimates that approximately €15 million was spent by external forces to destabilise the electoral process, including through groups linked to fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor (Ukrinform, 2024). Authorities believe that the money was part of a large, ongoing political influence buying operation managed by Shor (Reinsford, 2024).
As a result, the incumbent President of Moldova, Maia Sandu, a candidate of the Action and Solidarity Party, won 55.25% of the vote. The candidate of the Socialist Party of Moldova, Alexandru Stoianoglo, received 44.75% of the vote (BBC, 2024).
A different electoral picture can be seen in Romania. There, an unknown far-right candidate who didn’t have much support from the electorate received unpredictable results after the first round of the presidential elections. His success is easily explained by the huge information campaign on TikTok.
Romanian intelligence services have uncovered an extensive coordinated TikTok campaign that dramatically influenced the first round of presidential elections. According to declassified documents, over 25,000 accounts participated in the campaign, which led to an unprecedented surge in support for far-right candidate Călin Georgescu — from 5% to 23% in just three weeks. He is a sceptic of Ukraine and NATO, has publicly supported Russia and praised his country’s fascist leaders during World War II. The scale of manipulation, particularly on TikTok, was so significant that Romania’s Constitutional Court ultimately nullified the election and ordered a new vote (Šlerka, Stănoiu, 2024). Additionally, journalists discovered a network of 18 additional websites that coordinated to publish pro-Georgescu articles and distribute them through paid Facebook advertising. These sites are connected to the Alliance for Romanian Unity (AUR), a far-right party supporting Georgescu.
After the first round of the presidential elections, the country’s Supreme Defense Council (CSAT) convened to discuss potential foreign interference in the electoral process. The Constitutional Court of Romania later annulled the second round of the elections in December 2024. Investigators claimed that the Georgescu campaign dealt with Russian influence and contractors. The President of Romania Klaus Iohannis declassified an intelligence report that alleged Moscow ran a sprawling drive comprising thousands of social media accounts to promote the pro-Russian candidate Călin Georgescu across platforms like TikTok and Telegram (Cole, 2024).
The main purpose and channels of intervention
Traditionally, the Russians propagandists are masters of provoking debates, they directly and indirectly play on contradictions, exploiting weaknesses of different societies. They skillfully raise contradictory topics that make people argue with each other, although we have seen this in European countries too, especially during elections. This technique works. They invest resources in one narrative and the other, banging people’s heads together. They adapt well and quickly, but very rarely come up with something new in order not to invest resources in new advertising. They mostly use existing narratives. In all existing discussions in society, Russians raise the temperature of the conversation and divide society (Tsybulska, 2024).
Additionally, as part of the ‘blame and victimize’ strategy, Russia has created specific messages for different audiences. For example, in Eastern Europe, that Ukrainian refugees would allegedly take their jobs; in Western Europe, that the war would raise food and oil prices etc. In the Western Balkans, Russian messages found even more suitable ground due to historical and cultural ties with Serbia and its expansionist goals in Kosovo and Bosnia (Fetoshi, 2024).
The main channel of influence to voters in the Romanian case was social media, especially TikTok. The basic fact is that TikTok has become remarkably popular in Romania, rivaling Facebook as the country’s most-used social network. Current research shows that TikTok matches Facebook’s user base of approximately nine million users and is projected to become Romania’s leading social platform last year. Nearly half of adult Romanians, who have the right to vote, use TikTok, spending over 30 hours monthly on the platform — the highest engagement rate among all social networks. The platform’s Romanian demographic skews older compared to countries like the Czech Republic, where TikTok’s roughly two million users are predominantly under 34 (Šlerka, Stănoiu, 2024).
Documents declassified by Romania’s top security council indicated that the country was a target of ‘aggressive hybrid Russian attacks’ during the election period (Cole, 2024). Because in early November 2024 polls showed minimal support for Georgescu. However, after just three weeks, he secured victory in the first round with nearly 23% of the vote. This dramatic shift sparked intense reactions across Romania, leading to widespread demands for an investigation. The evidence revealed that Georgescu was massively promoted on TikTok through coordinated accounts, recommendation algorithms and paid promotion. Even more, the influence operation, which links to Russia, reportedly involved approximately 25,000 TikTok accounts that intensified their activity two weeks before the election. Each account used unique IP addresses to avoid detection as a botnet. The operation also activated 797 dormant accounts that were created in 2016 but remained largely inactive until November 11, 2024 (Šlerka, Stănoiu, 2024). Another method of promoting an independent candidate involved the creation of accounts that falsely portrayed the actions of Romanian state institutions.
Russian interference in the Romanian elections is obvious to European politicians. Germany’s foreign ministry posted on X (formerly Twitter) that reports by Romanian authorities that Russian disinformation is influencing the presidential elections in Romania show: (Russian President Vladimir) Putin wants to divide us and to undermine the unity within the EU and NATO (German Foreign Office, 2024). The improbable TikTok-assisted rise of Mr Georgescu in Romanian presidential running is merely the most startling example of the use of social media and messaging platforms to bypass mainstream sources of information.
After the election campaign in Moldova, we can draw the same conclusions. Commenting on the election results in Moldova, European Commission spokesperson Peter Stano said that they show how difficult it is to combat Russian interference in the electoral process. European institutions have to follow the rules, and Russia does not (Cedro, 2024).
In general, the interference was aimed at destabilising the democratic process. Russian interference in Moldova has many forms and is not limited to the election campaign period. The Kremlin’s dedication to hybrid warfare techniques is stepping up as it seeks to pollute the well of public discourse and undermine popular aspirations to join the European Union and NATO. Moldova’s recent presidential election, and a referendum on enshrining the desire to join the EU in the constitution, were both marred by allegations of Kremlin interference (The Guardian, 2024). Moscow has also propagated disinformation and funded far-right extremist groups, fuelling violent ‘anti-western’ sentiment over issues such as LGBTQ+ rights. This situation seeks to force social media to comply with stricter moderation rules in its Digital Services Act.
With increasing skill and impact, Russia, and far-right parties across Europe, are using such forums to generate an alternate political reality based on viral misinformation and distortion. And the growing influence of artificial intelligence will create more and more opportunities for manipulation and dissemination of distorted information for certain political benefits, and thus, the facts of external interference in electoral processes will become more common.
How to resist external influences in elections
External interference in the electoral process distorts the political reality in the country and poses a threat not only to political institutions, but also to democracy as a whole. This is why it is important to recognise threats and effectively counter them in a hybrid war. Considering the hybrid warfare against the West, in recent years we have been dealing with Russian interference in elections in other countries.
The European countries have their own experience of countering Russian interference in the electoral process, either through strong civil society institutions that systematically work to expose fakes and manipulations, and effective state institutions.
1.States should not only take account of the hybrid threats, but also make effective efforts to counter them through development of national legislation and strengthening cybersecurity. Romania’s Constitutional Court cancelled the country’s presidential election before the second round amid reports of Russian interference (Radio Liberty, 2024). The country has benefited from adopting a new electoral code that introduced stricter regulations to prevent illegal campaign financing; the unveiling of a new national security strategy that aims to strengthen the resilience of state institutions and acknowledges Russia as an existential threat to national security; and creating institutions, such as the Centre for Strategic Communications and Combating Disinformation and the National Cybersecurity Agency, to fight against hybrid threats. All these accomplishments better protect election processes, disrupt and combat Russian narratives, monitor the flow of disinformation, and counteract the influence of dirty money that supports malign operations (Ntousas, Plesca, 2024).
2. Cooperation between the EU, international institutions and various countries facing Russian malign interference, sharing information and methods of fighting the hybrid threat brings benefits. Moldovan officials have also worked to combat the influence of Russian, especially they fight against the influence of oligarch Ilan Shor, who has previously been convicted of fraud in Moldova and who has funded massive disinformation campaigns in Moldova on behalf of Russia. With help from the United States, the European Union, and NATO, Moldova has poured significant resources into countering Russian disinformation and interference leading up to its election (Benjamin, 2024).
It is an opinion that Russia would most likely have achieved its objectives were it not for the support of the EU and NATO countries to Moldova. Thanks to the EU’s EUPM Moldova mission, the Centre for Strategic Communication and Countering Disinformation, the Cyber Security Agency, and others were launched. Cooperation with the Moldovan intelligence services has been strengthened and a number of local initiatives to counter disinformation have been reinforced, providing training and funding, among other things. Prior to the elections, the EU deployed the Lithuanian-led Cyber Rapid Response Team to Moldova. Indeed, Moldovan state institutions still lack the capacity to respond independently to Russian hybrid interference (Bryjka, 2024).
Josep Borrell, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs, has praised Moldova’s efforts in countering thousands of Russian hybrid attacks, commending ‘the resilience of the Moldovan government in face of these unprecedented challenges’ and insisting that the EU continues supporting the security, stability, and resilience of Moldova (Victor, 2024). Moldova and the EU have also agreed on a security and defence partnership, which pushes for cooperation on shared security challenges such as fighting cyberattacks, and countering hybrid threats and disinformation.
3. Strong independent media and non-governmental organisations can bring transparency to the electoral process and work in the field of media literacy. Some experts claimed that many forms of interference seen in the US were also observed in elections in Europe and beyond (Kovalčíková, Spatafora, 2024). And authorities should focus on increasing transparency and raising awareness about manipulative techniques used by foreign interferers. By the way, AI misuse will require increased government resources and ongoing exercises throughout election cycles to keep pace with technological advancements. It also requires enhanced engagement with social media and technology companies, regulation of the algorithms enabling the amplification of harmful content, and greater accountability within the private sector. Such measures would further strengthen efforts to crack down on AI-driven information manipulation.
4. Additionally, there is the issue of social media regulation, especially during election campaigns. The EU and its Member States should consider a similar system to ensure that government alerts about malign interference remain free from political influence, with media from across the political spectrum equally engaged in communicating evidence to foster a common understanding.
However, cooperation between states in countering Russian hybrid threats is no less important. Сountries, especially from Central and East Europe must continue to receive sufficient support to thwart the Kremlin’s hybrid aggression.
Conclusions
Due to its interactivity and multimedia nature, social media is an effective tool for election campaigns, allowing to activate supporters and counteract opponents. On the other hand, social media have led to the emergence of such phenomena as trolls (trolling), bots (bot industry, bot farm), which have a negative impact on the formation of public opinion and challenge the functioning of democratic institutions.
In the context of hybrid warfare, social media can be used to interfere in election campaigns, as we can observe during the presidential election campaigns in Moldova and Romania in 2024. There have been attempts by Russia to change the state policy to distance itself from European integration and reorient it towards Moscow (in the case of Moldova) and to support the right-wing candidate, who will strengthen pro-Russian sentiment in Europe (in the case of Romania).
In general, Russia’s foreign interference campaigns in Europe are more extensive than many realize. The campaigns, which have been going on for years, aim to boost support for far-right political parties in Europe, increase polarisation of society and undermine trust in state and European institutions.
The Russian state propaganda machine is actively using social media to spread fake news and disinformation. They adapt to local audiences, take into account local specificities, and use new mechanisms and tools. A striking example is Romania, where an influence campaign was launched on TikTok, which has a huge audience in the country. This helped a little-known candidate break through in the first round of elections. In Moldova they worked with Russian speaking people, criticising the president and her pro-European development policies.
Not only Moldova with its position between the West and Russia makes it a prime target for Russian disinformation campaigns, but other European countries have also been targeted. The nature of Russia’s attacks on Moldovan and Romanian democracy provides insight into how Russia may attempt to interfere in other Western elections, including within the European Union and the United States. We face the same challenges in the Balkans where Serbia is trying to replicate the Kremlin’s actions. It is clear that the post-war elections in Ukraine will be targeted by Russia.
The EU must support non-EU countries in their democratic efforts to build societal resilience, for example through the new security and defence partnership. The bloc can also promote strategic partnerships between cybersecurity institutions to counter cyberattacks and limit the spread of disinformation.
Social media has become a powerful communication platform that cannot be ignored in election campaigns. It has a destructive effect on political competition and can undermine trust in democratic processes and institutions. After all, external interference and propaganda, amplified by algorithms and artificial intelligence capabilities, can create a distorted reality and have unpredictable consequences in the future. The misuse of AI to manipulate people and political processes should therefore be the focus of future research.
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