GROWING AND DIVERSIFYING THREATS OF RUSSIAN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Abstract

The growing and diversifying threats of Russian unconventional warfare are directed at states outside of Ukraine. These activities contribute to the wider use of information operations and active measures to destabilize and undermine opposing states. Russia's approach has been remarkably consistent for decades. The overall approach is to use information operations and active measures to polarize the target population, mobilize factions to support allied elites, and paralyze support for opposing elements of the country's leadership. Human intelligence operations /HUMINT/ are used to try to capture the elite by offering help to politicians who support Russian interests. Finally, violence can be used to escalate political tensions to the point of crisis or in other contexts to isolate a captive elite.

This paper emphasizes:

1. First, although Russia's capacity for covert violence in Europe has been disrupted by the exposure of its personnel and the dismantling of elements of its support apparatus, the Russian state is actively working to rebuild that capacity.
2. Second, the intention to achieve this reflects a broader vision to widen the opening of geostrategic competition with the West, which could be manifested in Europe but is already being carried out to a large extent in Africa.
3. Third, the kaleidoscopic and chaotic lines of effort (example of Kadyrov) carried out by the Russian special services - if left unchecked - will become increasingly mutually supportive and harder to disrupt.

Russian approaches are often crude with a series of failures. Institutional and operational security are often weak, although the current process of restructuring and reform may strengthen the ability to keep operations undetected. In the Russian special services, there is a systemic problem with the lack of independent analysis. Those charged with carrying out the operation are primarily responsible for assessing its possible success and therefore tend to overestimate their capabilities. Nevertheless, the Russians are persistent and, if not stopped, failures such as those experienced in Mozambique turn into successes as seen in Mali. Europe is facing a series of elections this year, and the initial chaotic implementation of active measures is gradually becoming more coherent under the close attention of the Russian presidential administration.

Faced with this threat, Western nations must realize that undermining the human intelligence activity/HUMINT/ that supports unconventional warfare methods is critical to degrading Russia's ability to use the techniques described in this paper. In this context, countering disinformation - although important - results in less success than cutting off Russian access to and influence over elites. This can be achieved by exposing its activities and arresting its agents and intelligence officers. Strengthening counterintelligence activities in this sense is an important priority. The risk is that the effort to contain Russia becomes McCarthyist paranoia. As many of Russia's unconventional operations are self-defeating, countering Russian unconventional warfare must be based on careful, selective, intelligence based targeting. This is why it is essential to have a broad understanding of Russian forms and methods; protects the state from jumping into the shadows.

Ultimately, Russia's progress in Africa is the formation of the "Roskolonia Entente". On the one hand, it is as Russian officials admit internally a colonial project to gain control over African governments and exploit the continent's natural resources. On the other hand, the Entente or informal and friendly alliance between factions - reflects the fact that Russia has been called upon to take that role, and juntas that invite Russians often have significant popular support, at least among the majority ethnic groups in their countries.

Russia's mandate is a consequence of the West's strategic neglect and its failure to address the problems facing its partners. Russia may also fail to do so, but for now frustration with the West in both Africa and the Middle East is high. The point is that as Western states focus on rebuilding their conventional deterrence in Europe, strategic documents emphasizing the nature of global competition are justified. However, Western countries fail to compete. This has to change. Russia uses unconventional warfare to advance its vision of a multipolar world order. This poses a threat far beyond Ukraine. It is of crucial importance that the Western countries face this challenge.