Prof. Asoc. Dr. Arben Fetoshi
In the framework of its hybrid warfare against Kosovo, Serbia has adopted the Russian model, tailored to serve its political objectives in the local context. Disinformation, cyberattacks, military threats, and subversive efforts are verified operations that Serbia attempts to mask through a strategic narrative of the “persecution and planned expulsion of the Serbian people from Kosovo.” Similar operations were carried out by Russia in its attempts to “legitimize” its aggression against Ukraine in 2022. De-Nazification, the protection of Russians from genocide, and the rectification of Soviet mistakes are Putin’s strategic narratives, aimed at concealing the objectives of his chauvinistic policies. However, despite the mimicry, and by exploiting the differing international context, Serbia plays the role of a “victim” concerning its responsibilities towards Serbs in Kosovo.
Deconstruction
Disinformation as ammunition for information warfare and propaganda as a political strategy, while potentially pursuing different objectives, interact within the political domain by aiming to persuade through deceit. In this combination, narrative plays a crucial role as a mechanism for constructing meanings, becoming strategic when oriented toward specific goals. According to the European Communication Monitor (ECM, 2018), Serbia ranks as the third most impacted country in Europe by fake news, with almost all its media organizations disseminating such content. Adding to this the assessments of international organizations on Vučić’s media control and the establishment of a Russia Today branch in Belgrade following EU sanctions (Reporters Without Borders, 2024), the Serbian audience’s susceptibility to Russian propaganda and emotional manipulation regarding Kosovo becomes evident.
The false historical narrative of Kosovo as the “cradle” of Serbia was reconstructed after NATO’s bombings (1999) into a narrative of a “political battle to reclaim Kosovo,” blaming the West as the aggressor. In the context of EU-mediated dialogue, Serbia has launched the strategic narrative of “repression against the Serbian people in Kosovo.” By portraying Kosovo as repressive and attributing false religious elements to an Islamic threat, Serbia aims to:
- Sustain domestic audience mobilization,
- Influence external audiences, and consequently,
- Garner international support for its demands.
Referring to the central processes of strategic narratives—legitimacy and identity—the deconstruction of the former requires citing the International Court of Justice’s opinion affirming that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not violate international law (ICJ, July 22, 2010). As for the latter, Kosovo’s Constitution (2008) affirms the status of the Serbian community within Kosovo. False claims of “repression and planned expulsion,” tied to the legitimacy of Serbia’s “grievances,” are debunked by police actions against criminal gangs and the terrorist attack by the group led by former Serbian politician Milan Radoičić in the north (September 2023). Moreover, references to the “Serbian people” in Kosovo conceal a perfidious psychological manipulation tendency through deliberately provoked incidents, such as the case involving local politician Aleksandar Arsenijević.
Media as an Agent
This strategic narrative is a joint endeavor by the state and influential actors such as the Orthodox Church and the media. It serves to present the government’s “truth” to Western actors and the EU while being systematically fueled by the church and media to influence domestic audiences. The church, which has been turned into an armory (Koha, September 25, 2023) and blesses war criminals (Radio Free Europe, 2008), and the media, violating professional standards through selective and biased reporting, work toward deceiving and persuading audiences. Serbian media amplify the disinformation narrative’s objectives by selectively reporting content that aligns with the strategic narrative.
To maximize effectiveness, Serbian media also propagate Russian anti-Kosovo messages, attempting to influence other audiences. The dominant “news” in these outlets revolves around themes of “persecution” of Serbs in northern Kosovo, the international community’s alleged “indifference” to this repression, and Kosovo’s status as an “unfinished issue.” Through the systematic broadcasting of such content, these media outlets act as agents of a strategic narrative aimed not only at mobilizing the Serbian audience or influencing external opinions by accusing international institutions but also at impacting public opinion in Kosovo by fostering insecurity, polarization, and distrust. Nearly all Serbian media follow this editorial policy, with the portal Kosovo Online, based in Zvečan, serving as an illustrative example. It broadcasts content in Albanian and English.
However, concerning Kosovo, Serbia’s hybrid warfare activities are not limited to disinformation and propaganda. Its expansionist objectives are best served by a Kosovo that is unstable, weak, divided, and plagued by public distrust.